International Human Rights Monitoring Mechanisms and their Effectiveness-Emphasis on The Human Rights Committee ,The African Commission and The ILO by Lifongo, William Moki
Faculty of Law
Lund University
Master of International Human Rights and
Humanitarian Law
Master thesis
By
William Moki Lifongo
International Human Rights Monitoring Mechanisms and
their Effectiveness: Emphasis on the Human Rights
Committee, The African Commission and The I.L.O
Supervisor
Professor Gudmundur Alfredsson
Human Rights
Autumn 2002
Contents
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORING
MECHANISMS AND THEIR EFFECTIVENESS:
EMPHASIS ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE,
THE AFRICAN COMMISSION AND THE I.L.O 1
1 INTRODUCTION 3
2 THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE 5
2.1 STATUS 5
2.2 COMPOSITION 5
2.3 ORGANISATION OF WORK 7
2.4 FUNCTIONS 7
2.5 EFFECTIVENESS OF THE COMMITTEE 11
3 THE AFRICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES´
RIGHTS 17
3.1 CREATION AND COMPOSITION 17
3.2 ORGANISATION OF WORK 18
3.3 FUNCTIONS 19
3.4 EFFECTIVENESS OF THE COMMISSION 23
4 THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANISATION 30
4.1 CREATION 30
4.2 MEMBERSHIP 31
4.3 STRUCTURE 31
4.4 MONITORING 34
4.5 EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ILO 38
5 COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE THREE MONITORING
BODIES 43
6 CONCLUSION 52
ARTICLES 57
1Acknowledgements
First of all I will start by thanking God for having given me the strength and kept
me save throughout this program.
 Secondly, I am very thankful to the Swedish Institute for having awarded me a
scholarship to study at this program, without this financial aid, I think I would not
have had the possibility of doing this program.
Thirdly, I will also like to thank my supervisor Prof Alfredsson, for his constant
assistance and guidance throughout the program and especially on this topic and
in the course of writing..
Fourthly to thank my family, for their words of encouragement and for always
being there for me.
 Also I will like to thank Prof Michealo Hansungule, Mr Lee Swepston, Professor
Manfred Nowak, Prof Rhamattullah Khan, Professor Ineta Ziemele, Lena Olsson
and Habteab Tasfay for their invaluable contributions during research and writing
of this paper.
Finally I say thanks to all my friends and classmates whose contributions through
our regular discussions have been of immense help to me in the course of writing
this paper.
2Abbreviations
ACHPR-----------------African Commission on Human and Peoples´Rights
ECOSOC-----------------Economic and Social Council
GAOR-------------------General Assembly Official Records
HRQ ---------------–Human Rights Quarterly
ICCPR--------------------International Covenant on Civil and Political  Rights
ICERD----------------International Convention for the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination
ILO--------------------------International Labour Organisation
MLR-----------------Modern Law Review
NGO---------------------Non-Governmental Organisation
NHRQ------------------Netherlands Human Rights Quarterly
OAU------------------------Organisation of African Unity
OP------------------------------Optional Protocol
SR-------------------Special Report
The Committee----------------The Human Rights Committee
The Commission-----------The African Commission on Human and
Peoples´Rights
UDHR-------------- Universal Declaration on Human Rights
UN-----------------United Nations
WG--------------------Working Group
31 INTRODUCTION
Human rights issues have always occupied a very important part in international
fora for a long time and especially after the First World War. The atrocities
committed during this war had made the world’s leaders to start thinking seriously
about the worth and dignity of the human being This was very evident in the
aftermath of the war at the Peace Settlement in Versailles, Paris. For the first time,
workers´rights were given international recognition. Workers were allowed to
participate in the peace talks and this led to them advocating for the elaboration of
an international labour legislation which further culminated in the creation of the
International Labour Organisation.
  The coming of the United Nations and the adoption of the UDHR and the
subsequent adoption of the Bill of Rights ushered in a new era of standard setting
on human rights issues. The next important preoccupation was how to give effect
to the plethora of treaties that had been adopted. There was the need to move
from standard setting to more concrete actions and enforcement measures. This
quest led to the creation of the first international human rights treaty body, the
Human Rights Committee.
     The various regions on their parts also began debates on the establishment of
instruments, which will offer adequate human rights protection. This started with
the American Declaration on the Rights of Man and Citizen. Due to the fact that it
was  a non  binding instrument, member states further adopted the  Inter
American Convention on Human Rights which per se was binding on all member
states. In Europe there was the European Convention on Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms and in Africa the African Charter on Human and
Peoples´Rights.The Inter American Commission and Court were established to
supervise the implementation of the American instruments, the European
Commission1 and Court to implement the European Convention and lastly the
African Commission to oversee the implementation of the Charter.
  The purpose therefore of this research is to look at how effective some of these
monitoring mechanisms have been since their inception. This will be done by
picking three monitoring mechanisms out of plethora of specialised agencies,
treaty bodies and regional bodies. Thus the ILO (a specialised body), the Human
Rights Committee (a treaty body) and the African Commission  (a regional body)
will be the case studies and points of departure.
 The first chapter will deal with the Human Rights Committee, what status it has,
how it organises its work, its functions and how effective it has been and the
problems it has been facing so far.
   The second chapter will deal with the African Commission and an overview on
its creation and composition, how its work is organised, its functions and in
greater detail how effective it has been in carrying out these functions. The third
                                                
1 Since the coming into effect of protocol 11, the commission was abolished and the court
made the only monitoring organ.
4chapter will dwell on the ILO and a cursory look will be made on its history,
structure, and membership and how it monitors its treaties and finally how
effective it has been in this domain. The last but one chapter will be a comparative
study between these three monitoring mechanisms based on criteria such as,
follow up mechanism, jurisdiction, state reporting, NGO participation among
others. Finally there will be a conclusion predicated on all the issues raised and
recommendations on how the various bodies can be made to be more effective
52 THE HUMAN RIGHTS
COMMITTEE
2.1 STATUS
    The ICCPR and the OP thereto were adopted by the General Assembly on
the 16th of December 1966 and entered into force on 23 March 1976 after 35
states parties had either ratified or acceded to the Covenant and 12 had ratified
or acceded to the OP.Pursuant to Article 28,of the Covenant, the Human Rights
Committee was established to oversee the implementation of the Covenant and
OP.It thus became the first universal treaty body control mechanism .Its first
session was held in New York on 1st January 1977-1st April 1977.
      The question as to what is the status of this Committee is a moot one. This is
due to the fact that it carries out functions, which are either judicial or
administrative in nature. This therefore makes it difficult to specifically say what
the status of the Committee is. However, Uribe Vargas describes it as “ a body
whose work was of a judicial nature”2. Tomuschat says it was not an international
court but was similar to one in certain respects, particularly in regard to its
obligation to be guarded by exclusively legal criteria which rightly distinguished it
from a political body”.3Mr Opsahl describes it as “the executive organ of the
Covenant”.4Mr Bouziri on his part says that the Committee was not a court of
law5. Lastly, the former Under Secretary of the UN Mr Herndl sees it as the
guardian of the Covenant.6Be it as it may and taking into consideration all the
descriptions given by the eminent scholars and personalities, the HRC can suitably
be described, as being sui generis. It should be seen as a body on its own, meant
for the implementation of the Covenant.
2.2  COMPOSITION
Article 28 of the Covenant, which provides for the establishment of the
Committee and Rule 18 of the Committee’s rules of procedure go further to state
its composition .It consists of 18 members who are to carry out the functions
                                                
2 Special Report 6 pr 73
3 ibid 117 pr 35
4 ibid 342 pr 68
5 ibid 231 pr 29
6 ibid 702 pr 4
6provided in the Covenant and the OP. The members are expected to be nationals
of state parties to the Covenant, of high moral standing and recognised
competence in the field of human rights with consideration given to persons having
legal experience, equitable geographical representation and representation of the
different forms of civilisation and of the principal legal systems.7It is worth noting
that these members serve in their individual and personal capacity and not as
representatives of their respective governments. This independence is very
fundamental to the Committee and will at least give it the potential to be effective.
However, the Covenant does not stipulate that a member must be independent of
his government. This explains why in practice, membership of the Committee has
included ambassadors, senior government representatives and national judges.
Notwithstanding this ever present link between the members and their
governments, the former have always stressed on their independence from
government and governmental institutions and entitled to be described legitimately
as independent experts. Their de facto independence is further evidence by the
fact that the UN and not states parties to the Covenant as stipulated by article 38
of the Covenant remunerate them.8This can be totally contrasted with Article 8
(6) of the ICERD, which stipulates that the governments are responsible for the
remuneration of the members of the Committee.
  The members of the Committee are elected by secret ballot by state parties to
the Covenant at meetings convened by the Secretary General of the United
Nations. They are elected from a list of nominees presented by the states parties
for a  regular term of office of  four years but members are eligible for re-election
if  re-nominated under article 29(3) of the Covenant. The term of office for those
elected at the first meeting began on the 1st January 1977 while those elected
subsequently begins on the date of expiry of the term of office of the out going
members whom they replace. However, in accordance with article 32(i) the terms
of nine members chosen by the chairperson by ballot expire after two years. This
is in a bid to avoid a complete change of the Committee at any one time and
ensure continuity in terms of membership status and its work. Article 30 gives a
detailed explanation of the election procedure and procedure in case a
replacement is sought for. Once elected into the Committee, the members are
entitled to all the facilities, privileges and immunities of experts on mission for the
UN laid down in the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the UN.
                                                
7 Article28 (2) ICCPR
8 Members of the Committee” shall with the approval of the General Assembly of the UN
receive emoluments from the un resources on such terms and conditions as the General
Assembly may decide…”
72.3 ORGANISATION OF WORK
To enhance a smooth functioning of its activities, the Committee has gone further
to formulate its own rules of procedure .It holds such sessions as are required for
the satisfactory performance of its duties. At inception, it held two sessions
annually but due to an increase in the volume of work, it now holds three sessions
a year for duration of three weeks for each session. The spring session usually is
held in New York while the summer and fall sessions in Geneva. It is worth noting
that due to financial constraints in the early years, the sessions were held in
Geneva but due to severe opposition by the members, the New York session has
since been regular.9 Usually, a working group working for one week precedes
each of these sessions.
  The Rules of Procedure established the offices of chairperson, three vices and a
rappoteur all elected for a two year term and eligible for re-election. Furthermore
the deliberations of the Committee are to be held in public unless the Committee
decides otherwise.10But in instances of inter state communications and individual
petitions, the deliberations are closed to the public. Added to this, at any one
session, twelve members will form a quorum and any decision taken must be by a
majority of those present and voting. Notwithstanding, this has hardly ever been
used since most decisions are always taken by consensus. This has greatly
contributed to the cooperative and conciliatory atmosphere within the Committee.
The official languages are English French, Spanish, Chinese, Russian and since
1984 Arabic while its  official documents are of general distribution unless it
decides otherwise. Recently, it has recognised the importance of publicising as
can be seen from its practice of circulating press releases, participating in human
rights meetings through its members, articles and other publication on it modus
operandi by its members and the publication of the year book of the HRC.
2.4 FUNCTIONS
The Covenant and OP provide for three distinct functions of the Committee. But
in practice, it carries out more than these three functions. From inception, It was
mandated to oversee the respect and implementation of the ICCPR by the
examination and consideration  of reports submitted by state parties, 11 to
consider inter state complaints or communications12 and lastly to entertain
                                                
9 Only one session has been held out of New York or Geneva i.e. 14th session in Bonn
10 Rule 33
11 Article 40(i) (ii)
12 Supra
8complaints made by individuals within the jurisdiction of state parties to the
Covenant and OP who claim that their rights under the Covenant have been
violated.13Added to these functions, the Committee also submits annual reports to
the General Assembly via ECOSOC on its activities .It has also developed the
practice of issuing statements.14A cursory look will now be made on the three
principal functions of the Committee.15
 EXAMINATION OF STATE REPORTS
Upon ratification, or accession, to the Covenant, each state party ipso facto
undertakes to submit reports on the measures they have adopted which will give
effect to the rights enshrined in the Covenant and progress it has made in the
enjoyment of these rights.16These reports are submitted to the Secretary General
who in turn transmits them to the Committee for examination and deliberation
before it issues its final comment. Three types of reports have consequently
emerged in practice.
  Firstly the initial reports which are submitted a year after the Covenant enters
into force for the state party concerned. State parties are required to report on
measures they have taken since becoming members to give effect to the absolute
respect to the rights therein contained in the Covenant. The word “measures”
should be noted was used to give states greater freedom and the possibility to
report on a wide range of laws and practices, which show compliance with the
provisions of the Covenant. The Covenant is silent on the contents of the reports
but due to extreme diversity in the various reports, the Committee resorted to the
issuing of guidelines, which have aided in the drafting of these reports and have
created some uniformity on the issues to be addressed in each state report.17
    Secondly, supplementary or additional reports are submitted whenever the
HRC is not satisfied with the form and contents of the initial report or any other
report made thereafter. This is so because some member states do not provide
adequate information, which conforms to the guidelines issued by the Committee.
In such a situation the Committee will ask for additional information, which can
                                                
13 Article 1 OP
14 In 1987 issued Statement on the Fight Against Racism and Racial Discrimination
15 Supra
16 Article 40 ICCPR
17 General Guidelines Regarding the Form and Contents of Reports from states parties under
Article 40 of the Covenant .Doc CCPR/C/5:Doc A/32744 Appendix II adopted by HRC 44
meeting (2nd session) 29th August 1977
9either be provided orally or in writing. It is worth noting that the legality of such a
procedure is debatable but majority of the members share the view that the legal
basis of this procedure exist on the obligation of the state to fully comply with its
obligation under article 40 (i)(b). In a number of cases the Committee has insisted
that it will not examine a report until additional information has been provided.
This has been the case with Uruguay and El Salvador
  Lastly periodic reports are submitted  every five years after the initial report. In
an important “Consensus Statement “18, the Committee reaffirmed its desire to
work in constructive dialogue with member states through the process of periodic
reports. These reports are required to provide complete information demanded
by the Committee and also to show the progress a state has made since the
consideration of its last report by the Committee and also what problems were
encountered in implementing the provisions of the Covenant. Due to difficulties
encountered in the reporting procedure, the Committee has revised its procedure
to the extent that if a state submits its additional report in time, the Committee will
defer the date for submission of its periodic report. This amendment has greatly
contributed to the filing of additional reports on time. In the event of failure by a
state party to submit its report ,the Committee in the spirit of constrictive dialogue
sends a number of remainders to the state concerned: if this doesn’t work,
personal approaches are made by the chairman or his representative to the state
and in case of non compliance the matter is sent to the General Assembly for
discussion or the country situation examined in the absence of the report.
   EXAMINATION OF INDIVIDUAL COMMUNICATION
The second pivotal function of the Committee is the examination of individual
communications. Article 1 and 5 of the OP gives it the competence to receive
communications from individuals who claim to be victims of a violation by a state
party to the OP19.  A complaint is made by simply writing a letter to the
Committee care of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in
Geneva .As a matter of procedure, there are no possibilities of parties to appear
before the Committee and make oral pleadings. As soon as a complaint has been
filed, it remains a confidential issue and may even remain so after the case has
been closed. A summary of the procedure used in examining and individual
complaint is worth mentioning.
  The whole process starts by the registration of the communication. But it should
be noted that communications that are obviously inadmissible either because of
non-exhaustion of remedies or failure by the author to substantiate his allegations
are not registered.
                                                
18 Statement on the duties of the Committee under article 40 of the ICCPR Doc A/36/40 annex
iv
19 Presently 104 states have ratified the Optional Protocol I to the Covenant
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   The next stage is that of admissibility. The Committee here decides if the
registered communication meets the requirements of admissibility; viz that the
communication is not anonymous and it  is from an individual subject to the
jurisdiction of a state party, that the individual is a victim of violations of rights
enshrined and protected by the Covenant, that the communication does not
constitute an abuse of the process, the matter is not before another international
instance of settlement and finally domestic remedies must have been exhausted.
Once a communication fulfils all these requirements, it is examined in the
Committee’s plenary session on its merits.
  In situations where the Committee is convinced that the situation may aggravate
before it reaches its final conclusion on the matter, it is empowered by virtue of
Rule 86 of its Rules of Procedure to request for interim measures to be carried
out by the state and prevent irreparable harm from being done to the individual.
The Committee has used this in a number of cases to good effect. In O.E v S20, it
held that the state party should not expel the alleged victim who had sought refuge
in country S to another state pending the consideration of the communication. The
Committee at its 28th session in 1986 also requested for a stay of execution of a
death penalty, which was granted by the state party (Jamaica). Notwithstanding,
there have been instances where some of these requests have not been granted
and led to the execution of victims or serious violations of their rights.21
 In the consideration of the communication, the Committee shuns away from the
usual practice of putting the burden of proof on the petitioner. This is so because
the state is always in a position to gather all available evidence, has access to
information which the author hasn’t and by virtue of article 4 of the OP is under
the duty to investigate in bona fide manner all the allegations made by the author.
In the absence of this collaboration from the state, any piece of evidence provided
by the author and corroborated by witness will constitute satisfactory evidence.22
 In recent practice, the Committee members append their dissenting opinions on
any conclusion reached; this is usually the case with matters where a minority finds
the decision unreasonable; for example the case of Cox v Canada.23.
Furthermore, the Committee has instituted a new approach in the examination
procedure, which is worth commenting on. At its 55th session in 1989, it decided
to designate a Special Rapporteur on New Communications who had the powers
to request for interim measures .At its 36th session, it authorised the Working
Group on Communications to adopt decisions declaring communications
admissible when all the five members agree.24Finally in accordance with Rule
88(ii), the WG on communications may decide to join the consideration of two or
more communications. This has positively contributed to the speedy processing of
individual communications
                                                
20 Case no22/1977
21 Chatat Ng v Canada (469/1991) and Kindler v Canada (47071991)
22 This was the case in case no 10/1977 Altesor v Uruguay and Case no 30/1978 Bleier v
Uruguay
23 Case no539/1993
24 Rule 87 (ii)
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EXAMINATION OF INTER STATE COMPLAINTS
  The Committee is vested with the competence by virtue of Article 41(i) of the
Covenant to receive communications from a state party, which claims that another
is not fulfilling its obligations under the Covenant. For this to be effective, the
states concerned must have made a declaration recognising the competence of the
Committee to consider the communication. In such a case, the Committee 25
“makes available its good offices to the parties concerned with a view to a
friendly solution of the matter on the basis of respect of human rights and
fundamental freedoms”. Detail explanation of this procedure is provided by
articles 41 and 42 of the covenant and rules 72 .77E under XVI of the rules of
procedure. Since there has never been an inter- state complaint it is not worth
considering any further.
   At the end of an examination of the reports and communications by the
Committee, it delivers its final conclusions, which are termed observations or
views depending on whether it is a report or a complaint. These conclusions have
led to marked improvements especially in the reporting procedure.
2.5   EFFECTIVENESS OF THE COMMITTEE
From its  inception till date, it can be submitted that the Human Rights Committee
has done a commendable job and experienced a marked improvement in
overseeing the implementation of the provisions of the ICCPR.It has played a
largely dominant and effective role to ensure the respect of human rights and in
putting human issues at the centre of world debates and discussions. These
achievements have been due to the following reasons.
   Firstly, the Committee has opened up and simplified access to any individual
who alleges a violation of his rights under the ICCPR.This liberal approach  to
access has therefore created an opportunity where in case of a violation, the
victim who hasn’t got remedies available at the domestic level will always resort
to the Committee. It is important to note this was one of the first procedures
where an individual had locus standi before an international instance. Added to
this, the Committee through its jurisprudence, has positively interpreted Article 1
of the Optional Protocol relating to authorship very widely .By this interpretation,
                                                
25 Article 41i e
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an author of a communication must not only be the victim but also includes his
relatives and legal advisers and anyone who can demonstrate a genuinely existing
link between themselves and the victim. This has been illustrated in some cases
especially in Morais v Madagascar26 and Burrell v Jamaica 27 where it was
held that the lawyers  who prosecuted the cases at the domestic level were
competent to make a complaint on behalf of the victims. This however led to a
floodgate of claims from victims and their representatives alleging violations.
Furthermore, the Committee through  its practice has been seen to entertain
communications made by groups of persons who have suffered similar violations
notwithstanding the fact that the OP refers only to individuals. This also has made
it possible for massive violations to communities to be vindicated as was
illustrated by Bernard Ominayak, Chief of the Lubicon lake band v Canada
28and Länsman et al.v Finland.29
    Secondly , it has been revealed in a study30 carried out that the jurisprudence
of the Committee has led to significant changes in the domestic legislation of some
member states. It showed that Mauritius and the Netherlands made significant
changes in their legislation after the Committee’s consideration of individual
communication and adopting its views in the Mauritius Women Case (Shirin
Aumeeruddy- Cziffra et. al v Mauritius)31 and Dutch Social Security System
cases (Broeks v the Netherlands32 and Zwaan-de Vries v the Netherlands)33
under non-discrimination in article 26.
  Furthermore, the Committee has gone further to institute follow up procedures
to monitor  the implementation of its decisions .At its 17th session, some of its
members expressed doubts about its competence to engage in this since it is not
expressly stated by either the Covenant or the Optional Protocol. But this
competence has been said to be implicit in the preamble of the OP, which states
that the Committee can receive and consider communications “to further achieve
the purposes of the Covenant and implementation of its provisions”.
Notwithstanding, the ICJ has held that in the absence of specific powers, an
international body may act in ways not specifically forbidden for the achievement
of its purposes and objectives34. This therefore gives the Committee the legal
basis to carry out follow up procedures and cannot be said (as it is by some
states) to be contrary to article 2(7) of the United Nations Charter.
                                                
26 G.A.O.R 38th  session supplement no40CA/38/40 report on the HRC p 141
27 G.A.O.R 51st session supplement no 40CA/51/40 report on HRC CCPR/C/57/D/546/1993
28 G.A.O.R 45TH session supplement No 40 CA/745/40 report on the HRC pg 1.
29 Case no 671/1995 HRC 1997 Report Vol .II, Annex VI, Sect.5 para 10.7
30 Cohn:  ”The Early Harvest: Domestic Legal Changes related to the HRC and Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights”(1991) 13 HRQ p295-321
31 Communication No 35/1978, views adopted on 9th April 1981
32 Communication No 172/1984 views adopted on 9th April 1987
33 Communication No 182/1984 views adopted on 9th April 1987
34 Reparation for injuries suffered in the service of the United Nations .ICJ reports 1949 p174-
188
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   Conscious of the fact that its views must implemented for its work to be
effective, the Committee in 1990 instituted the mandate of Special Rapporteur for
the Follow Up of Views .It further adopted guidelines for the follow up and spelt
out the competence of the special rapporteur.35In the execution of his duty, the
rapporteur requests states in respect to which decisions of violations have been
made to provide information on the measures they have undertaken to give effect
to the decisions of the Committee. When these reports are made, he/she prepares
an annual report which is submitted in the Committee’s plenary.
   In cases of non-compliance by states to provide the information requested for
by the rapporteur, he is empowered by Rule 95(ii) of the Rules of Procedure to
make such contacts and take actions appropriate for the performance of his
duties. By virtue of this, he holds consultations with the representatives of the
states concerned. It is worth stating that most of these consultations are held at
ambassadorial level evidencing the importance given to this procedure by state
parties. These consultations have helped in educating the member states on the
consequences of non cooperation and has led to many states submitting their
reports in order to avoid the unpleasant experience of being in the “follow up
black list “of the Committee36and being singled out for criticisms.
    In situations where state parties after consultations still fail to comply with the
Committee’s decision, the last resort left for the Special Rapporteur is that of
undertaking fact finding missions. This entails the Rapporteur making a visit to the
state concerned to meet with the authorities and members of the non
governmental organisations, visits to places of detention and other areas of
interest to gather first hand information on the implementation of the Committee’s
decisions. Even though it has been said that this method is an overly extension of
the implied powers of the Committee, its importance should always be
emphasized.  Firstly, it helps the Committee to obtain very reliable information on
the country situation, secondly, governments have been reported to have
improved their prison and detention facilities prior to the rapporteur´s visit, and
thirdly, the dialogue between the rapporteur and the personnel in the department
concern for the drafting of the state reports helps in the exchange of valuable
information on the appropriate form and content the reports should take and
solutions to some of the problems the state may be facing in the implementation of
the Committee’s decision.
  In June 1995,the Rapporteur37 visited Jamaica and this led to marked
improvements in the prison facilities and sanitary conditions in particular. The
                                                
35 Annual report for 1990, Doc A/45/40 Vol I p144.145: Vol II Appendix XI
36 Between 1994 .1997 the Special Rapporteur met with the representatives of the following
states: Once: Bolivia, Cameroon, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Madagascar., central African republic,
Uruguay and France.  Twice: Dominican Republic. Trinidad and Tobago, republic of Korea.
Equatorial guinea, Peru. Thrice and more: Suriname, Colombia and Jamaica: Markus .G.
Schmidt Follow–up Procedures to the Individual Complaints: International Human Rights
Monitoring Mechanisms (Eds) Gudmundur Alfredsson, et al.
37 When the function of the Special Rapporteur was created in 1990, the first Rapporteur was
the late Janos Fodor (Hungary) and he was successively followed by Andreas
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detailed report of this visit and others have not been  made public due to the
confidential nature of the procedures. By 1997, about 30% of the follow up
replies received were considered satisfactory because they showed that states
were willing to offer the right and appropriate remedies to victims of violation.
Some states have even gone ahead to adopt enabling legislations, which give the
decisions of the Committee a legal title. This has been the case with Peru in
198538 (even though it was rescinded nine years later by the regime of president
Fujimori), and Colombia in 1996 39.
  As can be observed, this follow up procedure is only used for decisions made
after the consideration of individual communications and as at now, there exist no
such procedure on observations made on states parties report. It is posited that
the institution of a Special Rapporteur on follow up on observations with the same
mandate and competence as that of Special Rapporteur on follow up on views
will contribute immensely to the implementation of Committee’s observation by
the parties concerned.
   However, the Special Rapporteur on the Follow Up on Views has not been
operating without difficulties.
   Due to financial constraints, the fact-finding missions have not been regular.
Also some member states have not been cooperating with the repporteur thereby
leading to serious difficulties. This was the case of the cancelled visit to Trinidad
and Tobago because of lack of cooperation and which led to the state opting out
of the OP.The Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaire) has also been noted for not
providing adequate information on its follow up procedures..
 Thirdly interim measures under Rule 86 have also contributed to the effective
functioning of the Committee. It has used this in a number of cases to protect
victims and prevent them from suffering irreparable harm. The Committee has
requested for stays of execution of death sentences and expulsion of individuals to
states were their rights might have been violated. This was the case in O.E v S40
and The Lubicon Lake Band (supra). In the same vein, the appointment of a
Special Rapporteur on new communications is worth mentioning; this rapporteur
has been vested with powers to issue requests for special measures of protection
when the Committee is not in session.
  Fourthly, the fact that the Committee through its rules on admissibility display a
remarkable degree of generosity by placing a lesser burden of proof on the author
has made it very possible and easier for violations to be vindicated. The state is
expected to produce evidence to show that there are remedies at the domestic
                                                                                                                           
Mavrommatis (Cyprus), Prafullachandra Baghwati (India) Fausto Pocar (Italy) and Christine
Chanet (France)
38 Law 23.506 of 1985 under which Peru undertakes to implement the Committee’s
recommendations. Rescinded 1996
39 Law no 288 of 1996:reccomendations of Colombian Ministerial Committee which approve
compensation of victims of the provisions of the ICCPR on the basis of Committee’s views
also included in Resolution 8/96 to 17/96 11th September 1996.See Annual Report of the
Committee for 1997 Doc.A/52/40-Vol I pgh 535
40Case  No 22/1977
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level and that they are effective. This is but fair enough since it can only be the
state, which has access to such information. It will therefore be very difficult on
the author if he is expected to provide information of this nature.41
  Fifthly, the Committee has used the embarrassment factor to great effect. In the
event of non-compliance, it transmits the matter to the General Assembly of the
United Nations via ECOSOC for scrutiny. Since most states will not appreciate
being under such form of public scrutiny, they make considerable efforts to
comply with its decisions; such compliance is gradually giving the decisions a de
facto binding quality.
   More so, the fact that the members have asserted and strongly acted on their
independence has contributed to the smooth functioning (at least procedural wise)
of the Committee. Since they are not state representatives, the deliberations are
void of political leanings and much time is saved for discussions on more concrete
issues.
  In conclusion, the Committee in the course of its operations have encountered a
number of difficulties, which must be addressed in order to make it more effective
in the protection of human rights. Such measures to be undertaken to improve on
this effectiveness will be dealt with in the last chapter.
 However some of the problems plaguing the Committee are worth mentioning.
Firstly, there is the issue of states not submitting their reports on time or at all.
Also and as already mentioned the inability of the special repporteur to carry out
regular visits to member states and verify the level of compliance with the
Committee’s decisions. Moreso there is the issue of confidentiality in the
Committee’s procedures and reports especially those of the special rapporteur
for the follow up on views. There is also the issue of shortage of and insufficient
finances experienced by the Committee. Furthermore there is also a very limited
access by non-governmental organisations to the Committee’s procedure and the
non-binding nature of the Committee’s decisions.
All these shortcomings and criticisms on the Committee can be summarised in that
of Hartman who says:
       “The Committee lacks all the adjudicatory powers of the European
Commission and Court of Human Rights. Furthermore, the Committee enjoys
neither the flexibility of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights to
decide on its own accord to study the human rights situation in any state party,
particularly the capacity to commence on-site investigations, nor the flexible fact-
finding methodology of certain ad hoc UN bodies.”42
                                                
41 In Bleier v Uruguay (No 30/1978) HRC Report 1982 Annex X, para 13.3, it was held by the
Committee that in cases where the author has submitted to the Committee allegations
supported by substantial witness testimony, and where further clarification of the case
depends on information exclusively in the hands of the state party, the Committee may
consider such allegations as substantiated in the absence of satisfactory evidence and
explanations to the contrary from the state party. Also in Grille Motta v Uruguay (No
11/197) HRC 1980 Report, Annex X, para 14, it held “a refutation of the author’s allegation in
general terms is not sufficient”.
42 Hartman made this remark in the context of a convention of international law experts from
a number of different countries meeting in Siracusa, Sicily in 1984 to discuss the limitation
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  But these notwithstanding, when one looks at the remarkable work of the
Committee especially its case law which is being cited today in courts all over the
world, in university circles and conferences of international law, it will not be an
over statement by saying that it has been effective to a large extent in the
protection of the rights enshrined in the ICCPR even though much can still be
done to increase its effectiveness. The contribution of lawyers, human rights
academics, NGOS and other UN bodies should also be stressed; for as Judge
Higgins puts it
         “…It would be bitterly ironic, if having won the battle to place human rights
at the legitimate centre of international concern, the liberal democracies throw
away the fruits of that victory by a failure to recognise that in large part, the
integrity of the Covenant lies in their own hands.”43
                                                                                                                           
and derogation provisions of the Covenant and entitled “Symposium on the Limitation and
Derogation Provisions in the ICCPR”. For details see “Working Paper for the Committee of
Experts on the Article 4 derogation provision,(1985)7HRQ pp 1-89
43 The United Nations: Some Questions of Integrity (1989) 52MLR p 1-21at p 20-21
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3 THE AFRICAN COMMISSION
ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES´
RIGHTS
3.1 CREATION AND COMPOSITION
 With the establishment of the Inter-American and European human rights
instruments and their monitoring mechanisms, there were calls by African jurists
for the establishment of an African mechanism to monitor, promote and protect
human rights in the continent. Added to this, the blatant human rights violations
carried out by some African leaders like Idi Amin and Emperor Bokassa further
intensified these calls for an African system. Under a declaration entitled “Law of
Lagos” the jurists called on the governments of the  various African states to
establish an African convention on human rights based on the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the Rule of Law.44These calls culminated in the
adoption of the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights in 1981 under the
auspices of the OAU45 which came into force in 1986.To further give live and
strength to the Charter, its provisions had to be implemented and this can only be
guaranteed by the establishment of a mechanism to oversee this. Thus by virtue of
Article 30 of the Charter, the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights
was established. It was primarily charged with the protection, promotion and
interpretation of rights in the Charter.46This was to be an independent body from
creation in 1987 but has been too closely linked with the OAU in the course of its
duties and  for reasons to be discussed later.
   The Commission is composed of eleven (11) members elected to work in their
personal capacity and not as representatives of their various states and
governments. They can thus be regarded in a sense as independent experts. In
practice, members are elected from the main regions of the continent i.e. northern,
eastern, central, southern and western Africa. They are elected by the Assembly
of Head of States and Governments through secret ballot from a list of candidates
nominated by the member states to the Charter.47Those elected are considered to
be personalities of the highest reputation and known for their high morality,
                                                
44 See law of Lagos, the African Conference on the Rule of law, Lagos Nigeria, January 1961
45 The OAU has been succeeded by the African Union, but since this is still very new and
has not yet set up its organs and for the purposes for this work, reference will still be made
to the OAU.
46 Article 45 ACHPR
47 Today all the OAU members have ratified the Charter
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impartiality and competence in matters of human and peoples´ rights and with
particular consideration given to those persons having legal knowledge and
experience.48A commissioner is expected to be involved in matters of human and
peoples´ rights either as a matter of academic or practical interest. In practice and
up until 1995, the first sixteen commissioners have all been lawyers. Once elected
and before resuming office a commissioner makes a solemn declaration of
impartiality and faithfulness which is evident of the fact that he acts as an
independent expert and not a state representative. Once in office and while on
mission, he is immune to inspection, detention, or seizure of personal baggage and
legal action in respect of words spoken or written when carrying out his duty.
They are also issued with laissez-passers of the OAU, which facilitate their
movement from one country of the continent to the other in the execution of their
duties. They are expected to serve for a six year term with the terms of four of the
first commissioners terminated after two years and three after four years to ensure
continuity of the Commission’s work. Since being a commissioner is a part time
portfolio, members do have their full time jobs. In most cases, they occupy top
positions in their various governments and this has been a ground for extreme
criticisms because it questions the very essence of their independence. In this vein,
it was recommended at the second workshop on NGO participation in the work
of the African Commission held in Tunis from the 28th of February -1st of March
1992 organised by the International Commission of Jurists in conjunction with the
Commission that holding of certain high offices like a diplomat or a minister of
internal affairs was in compatible with the status of a commissioner. It should
however be noted that this was a mere recommendation and has not been
adhered to in practice
3.2  ORGANISATION OF WORK
  At its second session in Dakar, Senegal, the Commission acting upon its
independence adopted its Rules of Procedure49, that were further amended at its
eighteenth session 50 These rules have contributed in giving more meaning and
have been complementary to some of the provisions of the Charter. By virtue of
these rules, NGOs are granted observer status51 in the Commission’s sessions
                                                
48 Article 31 of ACHPR
49 Article 42(2) Rules of Procedure of the African Commission on Human and Peoples´Rights
first Annual Activity Report of the African Commission on Human and Peoples´Rights 1987-
1988,ACHPR/RPT/ 1st Annex V.
50 Rules of Procedure of the African Commission on Human and Peoples´Rights (amended)
adopted 6th October 1995ACHPR/RP/XIX.It is worthy to note that the rules stated in this
thesis are the amended rules.
51 Rule 76
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and also have the locus standi to propose items on the agenda. This has made it
possible for the NGOs to be actively involved in the work of the Commission; it is
worth stating that this has contributed enormously to the collecting of information
by the Commission. The Rules have expressly given leave to individuals who are
victims of violations or someone acting on their behalf, or an organisation to make
a complaint before the Commission.52Members of governments, representatives
of NGOs, observers and the media usually attend the sessions. But proceedings
in the examination of complaints are very confidential and do take place in private
sittings. The sessions are presided over by a chairman and vice elected for a two-
year term53 and decisions are taken by a simple majority with seven members
present forming a quorum. The Commission meets twice a year for a period of
ten to fifteen days in Banjul and financing is done by the OAU, but however, any
member state is allowed to host the sessions if so requested by the government.
The working languages for the commission are English, French and Arabic.
3.3   FUNCTIONS
By virtue of Article 45 of the Charter, the Commission is required to promote,
protect and interpret the rights therein contained. It has as main function to see to
it that states parties protect these rights while the their citizens are educated on
their rights and duties as specified and enshrined  in the Charter. The
Commission’s functions can be classified into promotional, protective,
interpretative and the examination of reports and communications.
 Looking at the promotional functions, the Commission is required to create
awareness on the rights and duties contained in the Charter, how they can be
protected and what to do in case any of them is violated. Infact, there has been
and is still so much lack of information about the functioning of the Commission
due too much confidentiality in its proceedings. In order to make itself more open
to the public, the Commission undertakes studies, organises seminars, symposia
and conferences and works in cooperation with NGOs and other bodies like the
Raoul Wallenberg Institute, International Commission of Jurists and Amnesty
International. These activities have helped in publicising its work and led to much
awareness on human rights issues within the continent.
   Added to this, the NGOs on their part have contributed immensely in the
dissemination of information relating to the protection of human rights and have
even filed complaints on behalf of victims. The NGOs have reliably acted as a
reliable source of information for the Commission due to the direct contact they
have with the civil society in general and the victims in particular.
     Also in line with its promotional duties, the Commission has assigned its
commissioners to various African states wherein they are expected to promote
                                                
52 Rule 114
53 Article 42 of ACHPR
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the respect of the provisions in the Charter especially during intercessional
periods.54It is worth stating that the promotional duties are not the sole
responsibility of the Commission. Article 25 of the Charter also imposes a
corresponding duty on states to promote and ensure through teaching, education
and publication the respect of the rights and freedoms enshrined in the Charter.
  Added to the above-mentioned function is that spelt out by article 62 of the
Charter, which gives the Commission the competence to receive state reports.
Since there is no provision expressly giving it the powers to examine the reports,
the Commission in its third session sought the permission of the Assembly of
Heads of States and Governments to examine state reports. States are expected
to submit reports to the Commission after every two years. These reports are
expected to contain the legislative and other measures they have taken to give
effect to the provisions of the Charter. It is the procedure used to monitor
compliance by states of the Charter provisions and it has been described as “the
backbone of the mission of the Commission”.55It is also worth stating that this is a
similar procedure with the other regional and international bodies and like them
states have a poor record of submission. By 2000, only 23 state parties had
submitted their initial reports. More so and due to the disparity in the contents of
the various reports submitted, the Commission decided to issue guidelines to
states which were later amended and reduced to a two page document which list
out eleven points states must take into account in the preparation and compilation
of their reports.56Added to this, the Commission organised seminars in Banjul and
Harare in 1993 and Tunis in 1994 on the rendering of state reports and has
always requested the Assembly of Heads of States and Governments to appeal to
states to submit their periodic reports since it lacks the capacity to make the
states submit these reports. The examination of these reports gave the
Commission the opportunity to question the state on matters of violations brought
to its notice by the NGOs.It also provided the forum where there could be
constructive dialogue between the Commission and the state representative who
is usually a senior member of government and who has the competence to answer
the questions posed to him. In practice however there have been situations where
the state representatives have failed to attend the Commission ´s sessions thereby
leading to a deferral of the examination of the state’s report. Since this often led to
a halt in the Commission´s activities, it decided at its twenty third session that
                                                
54 Even if a state has not ratified the charter, see distribution of countries for commissioners
of the African Commission on Human and Peoples´ Rights for promotional activities as at
January 1996,ninth annual activity report of the ACHPR (1995-96);ACHPR/RTP 19th ;AHG
/207 (XXXII).annexVI;ACHPR/DIST/COUN/XIX;the Commission explains that it allocated
countries to commissioners on the basis of their nationality ,language  and distance from
their country of residence ;geographical distribution of countries among commissioners for
promotional activities DOC/OS/36e(XXII)
55 I.Badawi El Sheikh The African Commission on Human and Peoples´ Rights, Prospects
and Problems (1989) 7 NQHR 272-3 at 281
56 Amendment of guidelines for the preparation of periodic reports by states parties;
doc/05/27(XXII). see discussions at various sessions: agenda of the twenty first ordinary
session (15-24 april1997),tenth annual activity report of the ACHPR(1996-
7),ACHPR/RPT/10,annex III ;doc OS/1(XXI)Rev.IV item 7e:23rd session transcripts.
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those reports of states which failed to send representatives would be examined in
absentia.57This interestingly led to more state representatives attending the
Commission’s sessions.
 Thirdly, the Commission is vested with a protective mandate. This consists
principally of receiving communications and acting upon them in the manner
consistent with the provisions of the Charter. These communications can either
come from states parties under Article 47-54 of the Charter or from other
sources under Article 55 which has been interpreted by the Commission to mean
individuals and NGOs.A state which feels that another has committed a breach of
the Charter provisions may call the attention of the infracting state to the matter in
writing and send copies to the Secretary General of the OAU and the Chairman
of the Commission. The infracting state has three months within which to reply to
the allegation supported by documents of the relevant rules including available
redress and action taken. If both states fail to reach a satisfactory solution, either
of them may refer the matter to the Commission, which in turn tries to seek an
amicable solution and then makes a report to the Assembly of Heads of States
and Governments. Like other instances of protection, this procedure has never
been used save for one instance58. The fact that this procedure has hardly been
used is questionable taking into consideration the blatant violations of human rights
carried out by some governments.
  Furthermore, a communication may be received from entities other than states. It
is worthy to note that there is no provision in the Charter that expressly gives it
competence to entertain communications from individuals and NGOs.This has
evolved as a matter of interpretation by the Commission. The only reference in the
Charter is in articles 55-59 which merely states “other communications”. But
since its third session, the Commission has developed the practice of dealing with
individual communications.59 In this vein NGOs and individuals do have the locus
standi to bring complaints before the Commission.
  When a communication is received, it is registered and given a number60and a
copy sent to the state against whom the complaint is made for its comments on
admissibility. But for a communication to be held admissible, it is expected to
                                                
57 At the 23rd session at which the representatives of Chad and Seychelles failed to attend a
decision was taken to examine their reports at the following session. See final communiqué
of 23rd session. In its state reporting procedure information sheet no 4 at 11,the commission
affirmed that reports would be considered after the state had been sent two notifications
and failed to attend. the same decision was taken at the 24th and 25th sessions but reports
were not examined .however in relation to Seychelles,a final communiqué deplored this lack
of representation and it passed a resolution concerning the republic of Seychelles refusal to
present its initial report where it held that such persistent behaviour represents  deliberate
violation of the charter “firmly condemned this unspeakable behaviour”. It further invited
the OAU AHSG to “express their disapproval of such persistent refusal that amounts to a
deliberate violation” and to consider appropriate measures to be taken.
58 Libya v USA concerning the removal of Libyan soldiers from Chad after a military coup
d´etat in 1990.but the communication was declared inadmissible because the state
complained against was not a party to the charter
59 First annual report no 21pgh 26
60 Some communications have been recorded and later found not to be communications at all
e.g. no 63/92congress for the second republic of Malawi v Malawi
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contain the name of the author, be compatible with the provisions of the Charter,
not written in insulting and disparaging language, must not be exclusively based on
the media, must have exhausted all available domestic remedies and not before
any procedure of international settlement.61
In a number of cases where one or more of the requirements have not been met,
the Commission held they were inadmissible. In Ligue Cameroonais des droits
des l´homme v Cameroon62for example, it held that not only was the language
used insulting but also the allegations were not established. This has also been the
case with communications which are vague63, incoherent 64and against a non-
party65. The rules also bar information exclusively based on the media. This
however is intended to avert reliance on more hearsay evidence; but in cases
where evidence provided by the media is convincing, it will consequently be held
admissible. In April 1991, the Commission received information on violations in
Liberia during the civil war, trials and execution of military officers in Sudan and
the execution of students of Lumumbashi University by military officers through
the radio and acted upon it.
  In emergency situations, the Commission under article 58 of the Charter is
required to draw the attention of the Assembly of Heads of States and
Governments to the matter. This has received so many criticisms because it is time
consuming and even leads to irreparable harm being done to the victims. Since it
lacks the capacity to request for interim measures (not withstanding the fact that it
is provided for by rule 111 of its rules of procedure) the Commission has taken
upon itself to conduct investigations in such situations before making its
recommendation to the Assembly. It held in Lawyers Committee for Human
Rights v Zaire 66that allegations of torture, detention and arbitrary arrests were
series of serious or massive violations of human and people’s rights and requested
the Assembly of Heads of States and Governments to address the situation.
  The fourth important function of the Commission is to interpret the provisions of
the Charter. This is similar to an advisory jurisdiction. By virtue of article 60 and
61 of the Charter, the Commission is called upon to interpret the former´s
provisions. It has already adapted a number of resolutions interpreting various
rights including the right to fair trial and freedom of association.67But it is worthy
to note that in relation to provisions on peoples´ rights, discrimination against
women and on apartheid, the Commission states clearly that it takes its
interpretation from the conventions adopted by the UN on theses topics.
  Lastly article 45(iv) enables the Assembly of Heads of States and Governments
to request the Commission to carry out other tasks. But it is still unclear what this
                                                
61 Article 56 ACHPR.
62 Communication no65/92
63Case No 104/94,109/94 and 126/94 Centre for the Independence of Judges and Lawyers v
Algeria and communication no 35/89 S.Ayeh v Togo
64Case No 57/91 Tanko Banga  v Nigeria ; 142 /94 Muthuthirin Njoka v Kenya
65Case No 12/88 Mohammed El Nekheily v OAU
66 Case No 47/90
67 Resolution on the right to freedom of association, fifth annual activity report, resolution
on the right to recourse procedure and fair trial
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means: commissioners have nonetheless often been requested by the Assembly to
observe elections in various African countries.68
3.4 EFFECTIVENESS OF THE COMMISSION
 Since its inception in 1987,the African Commission encountered numerous
difficulties in its struggle for existence. Among the human rights regional monitoring
mechanisms, the Commission has so far proven to be the least effective in both
the ways it carries out its functions and the effect of its decisions. Scholars have
taken their turns in seriously criticising it due to this ineffectiveness and its failure to
properly carry out the functions entrusted to it by the Charter.
   However all has not been without some positive efforts being made by the
Commission to ensure the respect of human and peoples´rights.
  Firstly and in line with its promotional duties, the Commission is working hard to
create much awareness not only of its work but also on issues of human and
peoples´rights. With the collaboration of some partners like the Raoul Wallenberg
Institute, the International Commission of Jurists and UNESCO, it has organised
seminars, symposia and conferences to publicise its activities and educate the
participants who are mainly NGOs and other members of the civil society on the
rights and duties under the Charter. At its 11th session in 1992,the Commission
adopted a comprehensive program of activities for 1992-1996.Some of these
seminars included inter alia the implementation of the African Charter in the
internal systems, the role of the African media in the promotion of human rights,
the state reporting procedure, the status of women under the African Charter and
the situation of refugees and internally displaced persons in Africa.
  Furthermore, the Commission works in close ties with NGOs in organising
workshops and training seminars at the grassroots level. This relationship does
helps the Commission in obtaining information on country situations without
necessarily going to the field which of course will be a financial burden. Amnesty
International’s guide to the African Charter69 and the brochure on how to file a
complaint with the African Commission prepared by the International Commission
of Jurists70 are all examples of NGOs contributions in complementing the work of
the Commission.
   It is also worth stating that the Commission had proclaimed the 21st of October
each year as Africa Human Rights Day. All the member states are called upon to
                                                
68 See e.g. ninth annual activity report no54 pgh 15.two commissioners were part of the OAU
observer teams presented reports on elections in Tanzania and the Comoros islands.
69 Index:IOR63/05/91 Amnesty International (September1991)
70 How to address a communication to the African Commission ICJ (1992)
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organise activities in commemoration of this day. This had led to a wide
dissemination of information on the rights protected by the Charter and the work
of the Commission.
  Added to this, some of the visits undertaken by commissioners within the
framework of promotional activities have had some positive results on the
protection of human rights. One of such visits was that carried out by
commissioner Umozorike to the University of Ghana which partly contributed to
the creation of the Ghanaian Human Rights Committee.
   Secondly under its protective mandate, the Commission has worked within its
financial limits and undertaken missions to Togo, Nigeria, Senegal, Mauritania and
Sudan where serious violations were reported. Some of these missions were
aimed at putting pressure on the governments of the states concerned to respect
the rights of their citizens and seek amicable solutions to the problems that gave
rise to the violations. Added to this, some commissioners have acted on their own
personal capacity to ensure that the rights spelt out in the Charter are protected.
This is usually the case when violations occur between sessions. In Kalenga v
Zambia71 a commissioner on his own initiative secured the release of the
complainant who was wrongfully detained. The Commission has even extended
its protective mandate by sending observers to monitor elections in member states
as was the case with Mali.
   Not withstanding the lack of cooperation by states, the Commission has gone
ahead and acted dynamically in requesting for interim measures in cases of
violations. This was the case in Constitutional Rights Project v Nigeria 72(in
respect of Ken Saro Wiwa and 17 others) and Constitutional Rights Project
v Nigeria 73(in respect of M.K.O Abiola, A. Enahoro etc) and Jean Y.Degali
(on behalf of N.Bikagni), Union Interafricaine des droits de
l´homme,Commission Internationale de Jurists v Togo74 where the
Commission requested that the state should safeguard the health of the detainees
in the former cases and the security of  Corporal Bikagni in the latter case pending
the final determination of their cases. Whether this was respected by the state is
another issue but the fact that the Commission went as far as requesting for such
measures needs to be emphasised.
 Enforcing resolutions and recommendations has been a serious problem affecting
the Commission. But it has gone ahead to adopt a number of resolutions against
some states and using very strong language to condemn the violations being
carried out.75
    It has also appointed thematic rapporteurs to follow up the implementation of
its resolutions and of the provisions in the Charter.
                                                
71 Communication n0 11/88
72 Case No 139/94
73 Case No 140/94
74 Communication nos 82/92,88/93 and 91/93 (joined)
75 Resolution on Zaire, tenth annual activity report no67 annex XI; resolution on Burundi,
ninth annual activity report no54 annex VII; resolution on Liberia ninth annual activity
report no 54 annex VII
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    There is a Special Rapporteur on Extra Judicial, Summary or Arbitrary
Executions appointed at the fifteenth session (1994).76  He was mandated to
report extra judicial executions, collaborate with authorities and NGOs to find
perpetrators, recommend to the Commission on how to intervene and coordinate
with states for the punishment of the authors and the rehabilitation of the victims.
In his first report presented at the twenty- third session, he was working in
collaboration with some NGOS on the situation in Rwanda and Burundi. 77
   Also a Special Rapporteur on Prisons and Conditions of detention was
appointed at the 20th session78. He had visited places of detention in Zimbabwe,
Mali, Mozambique and Madagascar and made recommendations to the
Commission.
  Lastly the Rapporteur on Women’s Rights 79who was mandated to study the
situation of women’s rights in Africa, draft guidelines for states reports on
women’s rights, monitor the implementation of the Charter on this issue, assist
states in their implementation programs, encourage NGO participation in this area
and create the necessary links between other bodies like CEDAW and the
Commission. However, due to financial and logistical problems the rapporteur has
not been able to carry out her duties effectively. It is hope that taking into
consideration the importance of issues handled by this rapporteur, the necessary
funds will be made available for more effective work to be done especially with
the advent of the African Union.
    Furthermore, the initiative taken by the Commission to amend its rules of
procedure at its eighthteenth session is worthy to be mentioned. The new rules
transferred to its Secretary most of the powers given to the OAU Secretary
General in the old rules. It should be noted that one of the shortcoming of the
Charter, which tends to undermine the effectiveness of the Commission is the
subordination of the Commission to the OAU, a political body. Under the old
rules, the OAU Secretary General was entrusted to draft the provisional agenda
for each ordinary session in coordination with the Commission80. This led to so
much interference in the its activities by the OAU; but the amended rules have
rectified the situation with all the powers given to the Secretary of the
Commission.81Added to this, amended rules 33 and 40 have given the
Commission the powers to publicise its activities without necessarily asking for an
                                                
76 Hatem Ben salam final communiqué of the15th ordinary session, Banjul the Gambia
77 Progress of the report on extra judicial, summary or arbitrary executions in Rwanda,
Burundi, tenth annual activity report annex VI
78 Dankwa: final communiqué on 20th ordinary session of ACHPR grand bay muaritania21.31
October 1996ACHPR/FIN/COMM/XX pg 18.But today the post is occupied by Dr Vera
Mlangazuwa Chinwa who is a commissioner from Malawi
79 Commissioner Ondziel Gnelenga appointed to this position at the 23rd session .see final
communiqué of the session. Dr Angela Melo from Mozambique is currently occupying this
position.
80 Rule 6(1) of the old rules
81 Rule 6(1) of the new rules
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express approval from the Assembly of Heads of States and Governments as
stated in article 59 of the Charter.82
  Furthermore , the Commission is in the process of considering a mechanism for
dealing with emergency situations under article 58(iii) of the Charter. A draft,
which required the Commission to act promptly in situations of massive violations,
was concluded and tabled at the 21st session for adoption.
 Lastly at its 32nd session held in Gambia from 17th to 23rd October 2002, the
Commission adopted the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression in
Africa. This was envisaged to protect the freedom of press and freedom to
receive and impart information, which has been seriously violated in the continent
within the last decade and till date.
  By and large it seems obvious that the Commission has achieved some success
by setting up some of the various organs needed for the implementation of the
rights enunciated in the Charter, but this is no guarantee for the protection of these
rights. More efforts have to be made in terms of their functioning and
effectiveness.
     Notwithstanding, the Commission has always been the least effective
compared to other regional organisations. It has to a large extent failed to protect
the rights of those it was meant to protect. This failure has been due to the
following reasons.
 Firstly, it lacks an effective follow up mechanism to follow up on its
recommendations and to see into it that states do comply with them. The absence
of this means that the Commission gets no feedback from the states on their
compliance with its resolutions .In a sense, the resolutions are mere paper work
and they end up in the drawers of governmental departments; this has led to a
lukewarm attitude on the part of the states in complying with the resolutions
thereby giving the Commission an image of a toothless bull dog.
  Also the visits expected to be carried out by the commissioners to the countries
they have been assigned to do not take place regularly. The purpose, which is that
of keeping the Commission informed on the effect given to its decisions by
members states and the total compliance with and implementation of the
provisions of the Charter is not realised. More funds should be allocated at the
disposal of the commissioners to visit the countries to which they have been
assigned to at least once a year. In this vein they can use their presence to exert
pressure on the governments to give effect to the Commission’s decisions.
Notwithstanding, the commissioners are called upon to act dynamically during
these visits and in their encounters with government officials. Some commissioners
have been seen to be naïve or too scared to use such opportunities to raise issues
concerning human rights during such visits. This was the case when a
commissioner was sent to Nigeria and had a few minutes audience with the then
president General Abacha but  failed to demand the release of political prisoners
including the late Moshood Abiola, the reputed winner of the 1993 elections. It is
                                                
82 Rule 33 makes provision for the issuance of communiqués at the end of each private
sitting while rule 40 on its part provides leaves the publication of  minutes of private and
public  sessions to   discretion of the commission.
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submitted that the commissioners should use these visits to convince and if
possible pressurise the governments to respect the provisions spelt out in the
Charter. In the same vein, they should make it a point of duty to hold sessions
with human rights NGOs and leaders of the civil society in these states since this
will give the commissioner the opportunity to come in terms with the practical
realities.
     Secondly, the politicised nature of the Commission and the fact that it is
subservient to a political body like the Assembly of Heads of States and
Governments have seriously contributed to its ineffectiveness. Most of the
commissioners are highly placed government officials83 and this affect their sense
of judgement to the extent that they tend to protect the image of their government
whenever they are accused of violations. In such situations, political interests will
obviously override human right issues. This was very evident when the first state
report of Zimbabwe was presented. The chairperson of the Commission spent a
long time praising the human rights situation in that country and the way the report
was prepared. At the time he was the chairperson, he was his country’s
ambassador to Zimbabwe. This just goes along way to show how political issues
override human rights and questions the independence and impartiality of the
commissioners. Also the fact that recommendations from the Commission have to
be submitted to a political body like the Assembly of Heads of States makes it the
more ineffective and simply goes to buttress the aforementioned point. The
Commission should be vested with the competence to issue its own decisions
without necessarily submitting it to the Assembly.
   Thirdly, there is the acute problem of states not submitting their reports.
Presently 20 states are in arrears of their initial reports. This has greatly hindered
the smooth functioning of the Commission especially taking into cognisance the
fact that this is an important procedure used by the Commission to monitor state
compliance with the Charter. Added to this those states which try to report do so
episodically. They report once and wait for a long time only to appear later. This
impairs the system and hinders effective follow up and monitoring. A solution to
this problem will not lie on the Commission. The states are called upon to develop
the right attitude in submitting their reports and are also expected to exert
pressure on those states, which have not yet presented their initial report during
ministerial council meetings.
     Fourthly, the confidential nature of the Commission’s proceedings has not
been of help to its efforts to fight against human rights violations. With respect to
article 59 of the Charter, all measures taken during the proceedings are to remain
confidential until such time as the Assembly shall decide otherwise. The resultant
effect of this is that the public in general and victims in particular are not informed
on what the Commission is doing in the examination of individual complaints and
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are uncertain on what to do in order to vindicate their rights. Sometimes the
names of infracting states are not released to the public in a bid to protect them
from any public embarrassment not withstanding how influential and effective this
embarrassment factor can be. Since its 17th session in 1995, the Commission
began the practice of sending its decisions on complaints considered to the
respective parties. Hitherto, this was not the case and the decisions published in
the Activity Reports merely referred to the provision of the Charter alleged to
have been violated. It is submitted that the Commission should intensify this
practice by including the facts, the applicable rule and the ratio descedendi of the
decision. This will lead to much publicity and also strengthen its jurisprudence.
 Furthermore, it is worth noting that the effectiveness of Secretariat is very crucial
for the success of the Commission since the former handles the bulk of the work.
Nonetheless, the Secretariat is still very understaffed and lacks the basic, modern
and faster modes of communication like the Internet. This therefore makes it very
difficult to liase with other bodies like NGOs, which are vital partners in its day-
to-day functioning. Thus the secretariat’s work force should be strengthened by
improving the quality of its personnel. The Commission is an international body
and should therefore be supported by an international secretariat;  most of the
workers have been recruited locally and are all Gambian nationals. While there
may be important financial considerations for local recruitment, it is not worth the
price of effectiveness. Recruitment should include African scholars and NGO
representatives,84 which should be done through a competitive process and is
likely to ensure that those who work at the secretariat are very competent.
  The chronic financial state in which the Commission is functioning makes it all the
more difficult for it to be effective. Due to lack of finances, it cannot fully promote
its activities since commissioners are unable to visit the member states,
rapporteurs not able to carry out their functions and even documentation within
the secretariat not so easy to find. All these inabilities make it very difficult for
effective functioning of the Commission.
  At this point it also worthwhile to stress the uncooperative attitude of states.
Most states are very reluctant to use their official media to publicise the activities
of the Commission. This poses enormous difficulties for the Commission getting
right down to the grass roots during its sensitisation encounters. It is hoped that
with the growing political will and interest in human rights issues exercised by
some states lately, human rights will play a pivotal role in the Assembly’s
discussions and the much-needed finances channelled down to the Commission.
   Added to all of this, most Africans are poverty stricken to an extent that they
may not be able to pay the legal expenses at the domestic level and consequently
such violations do not go right up to the Commission thereby creating a vicious
circle of violations. Even though the solution to this problem may not necessarily
be within the realm of human rights, it still worth mentioning.
 Also the availability of more effective bodies to seek redress has totally exposed
the impotency of the Commission. Since most African states have also ratified
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other international instruments, victims prefer to by-pass the Commission thereby
depriving it of the cases it would have entertained and used to strengthen its
jurisprudence.
  Nevertheless, with the coming of the proposed African Court of Human and
Peoples´Rights it is hoped that it will complement the Commission in its functions
and the confidence, which has long been lost, will be regained. It is hoped that the
Court will be independent of all political leanings and like the other Courts will be
constituted by independent judges and have the competence to deliver binding
decisions on the matters addressed to it. Moreso, it will also entertain individual
complaints and unlike the Commission will not be confidential with is proceedings.
All these it is hoped will make the human rights monitoring mechanism more
effective thus making the rights enshrined in the Charter more enforceable.
    But since the Court is still to come into existence, the commissioners are called
upon to be more dynamic and act in true spirit of their independence because as
we anxiously wait for the Court, violations do occur on a daily basis.
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4  THE INTERNATIONAL
LABOUR ORGANISATION
4.1 CREATION
  The ILO was established in 1919 during the Peace Conference held in
Versailles, Paris at the end of the First World War. But this idea had been
advocated early in the nineteen century by two industrialists i.e. Robert Owen of
Wales and Daniel Legrand of France .At the conclusion of the Peace Treaties, it
was realised that the plight of workers constituted a very important part in
averting any future wars. Added to this, the industrial revolution had shown the
intolerable and harsh conditions under which the workers were expected to work.
Industrialists and trade unionists had started advocating for the respect of workers
rights and this was therefore an opportunity for them at the Peace Conference to
place their demands at an international forum. This consequently led to the
inclusion of workers representatives at the Conference and due to the backing of
France and Great Britain for an international labour legislation, the International
Labour Organisation was thus included in the Peace Treaty and its constitution
was part XIII of the Treaty of Versailles. Three reasons can be advanced for the
inclusion of this labour legislation in the Peace Treaty.
  Firstly and on humanitarian grounds, the workers were seriously exploited and
no attention paid to their lives, family and conditions of work. This was really
degrading to their dignity as human beings and therefore unacceptable.85
   Secondly the population of workers worldwide had increased tremendously
and there was the fear of them creating serious unrest or even revolutions that will
eventually disturb the peace of the world; so for political reasons, their needs had
to be taken care of86.
   Thirdly, was for economic motives since it was evident that disparity in the way
workers were treated in one part of the world will negatively affect international
trade. In a bid to boost productivity, workers worldwide were expected to be
treated equally.87
 With all these issues at stake, a commission of fifteen members was elected to
deal with the labour legislation. After holding a series of meetings and
consultations, it adopted a draft convention of the ILO, which was subsequently
                                                
85 This was enshrined in the preamble of the ILO thus “conditions of labour exist involving
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86 This is clearly expressed by the first part of the constitution which states that “universal
and lasting peace cannot be established only if it is based upon social justice”
87 This preoccupation appears clearly in the preamble of the constitution where it is stated
“the failure of any nation to adopt humane conditions of labour is an obstacle in the way of
other nations which desire to improve the conditions in their own countries.”
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adopted and incorporated into the Treaty of Versailles. At its first meeting the
same year, the ILO began its task of adopting international labour legislation in the
form of conventions and recommendations. It is worth noting that among these
first pieces of legislations were those protecting the human rights of workers viz
Conventions on Child Labour, Protection of Women in Work Places and Forced
Labour. The outbreak of the Second World War hindered the activities of the
Organisation but thanks to the commitment of member states, it was further
strengthened by the adoption of the Philadelphia Declaration in 1944, which
restated and modernised its aims and was eventually incorporated into the ILO
Constitution. This Declaration stated its mandate in terms of human values and
aspirations and strongly re-echoed the human rights mandate of the Organisation.
4.2 MEMBERSHIP
 Due to the quest for universality and the protection of workers´rights worldwide,
the ILO was created as an international organisation with membership open to all
the member states of the United Nations. In accordance with article 1(iii) of its
Constitution, any member of the United Nations may become a member of the
International Labour Organisation by simply communicating to the Director
General of the Organisation its formal acceptance of the obligations of the
Constitution of the ILO.Once this is received by the Director General, the
acquisition of membership is automatic .In cases where the state concerned is not
a member of the United Nations, the International Labour Conference will have to
decide by a vote concurred in by two thirds of the delegates attending the session
and two thirds of the government delegates present and voting 88.The
Organisation  has also given  observer status to a number of NGOs  and has even
gone as far as giving status to some liberation movements like for example the
Palestine Liberation Organisation. Once a state has acquired membership, it is
bound by all the conventions it signs and by the obligations flowing  from them.
However, the constitution also provides for states to withdraw their membership89
and for the conference to request such withdrawal.90Nevertheless, a member
state after withdrawal is still permitted to re-apply for admission.
4.3    STRUCTURE
                                                
88 Article 1 para 4
89 Article1 para 5. This was used by the USA in 1975 and has been used by some other
states since then
90 As was the case with South Africa .see ILC 45th session1961 record of proceedings
p891.also pp 575-577,580-584 and 599-616
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  The ILO is made up of three basic and principal organs.viz the International
Labour Conference, the Governing Body and the International Labour Office. But
before briefly stating the functions of each of these bodies it is worthwhile to
mention the unique and tripartite nature of the Organisation. It is an inter
governmental organisation but it is composed of representatives of workers and
employers associations as well as governments. They too form part of each of the
principal organs of the organisation.
  The International Labour Conference is composed of the 175 member states
that make up the Organisation. This is the plenary organ of the Organisation and is
usually attended by up to 4000 delegates, which include the government
delegates, workers´ and employers´ representatives, their advisors and delegates
representing the international inter. governmental and non-governmental
organisations. Each member state is represented by four delegates comprising
two government delegates, one worker and one employer delegate. The
Conference usually holds yearly sessions in Geneva in June. The government
representatives are usually Ministers of Labour and sometimes Heads of States
and Prime Ministers take turn to address the Conference. The main tasks of the
Conference include the elaboration and adoption of conventions and
recommendations and it has acted as a forum where social and labour matters are
freely discussed. Decisions are taken by a simple majority of the votes cast by
delegates present and voting91 except for other matters such as the admission or
readmission of members whereby a two third majority of members attending the
conference and a corresponding two third majority of government delegates is
required. For any decision to be valid the total number of votes cast should be
equal to half the number of the delegates attending the Conference.92Finally the
Conference is responsible for the adoption of the budget of the Organisation,
which is solely financed by the member states.
   The Governing Body on its part is considered as the executive organ of the
Organisation. It is made up of 56 members amongst whom 28 are government
representatives while 14 are workers´ and the other 14 are employers’
representatives. It is worth noting that of the 28 government representatives, 10
are considered permanent members and they come from the states of chief
industrial importance. 93 The other 18 members are elected by the International
Labour Conference every three years. It meets thrice a year in March ,June and
November and  is responsible inter alia for the execution of the decisions taken by
the Conference, prepares the budget for adoption , sees  into the implementation
of the standards set out in the various conventions and elects the Director General
who is the head of the International Labour Office. To facilitate its task it has
established six committees and a subcommittee to carry out specific duties,
   The International Labour Office in Geneva is the permanent secretariat of the
ILO.It among other duties prepares the documents and reports including
                                                
91 Article 17(ii) ILO constitution
92 Article 17(iii) ibid
93 These countries include Brazil, china, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, the Russian
federation, United Kingdom and the USA.
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background material for the conferences and specialised meetings, provides
guidance for technical cooperation programs around the world and most
importantly, it receives whatever complaint or representation is made against a
member state which is not giving effect to a convention it has ratified and also
coordinates the activities of the various regional offices functioning  in other parts
of the world.
 Since its inception, the ILO has been very successful in setting labour standards
through the elaboration and adoption of conventions and recommendations. Some
of these conventions have received wide ratifications and come into effect almost
as soon as they are adopted. Presently, the ILO has adopted a total of about 185
conventions under its auspices and has got more than 7000 ratifications.
   Since the purpose of this research is basically to look at how effective the
Organisation has used its various organs to implement the human rights
conventions that have been adopted under its auspices, it is important to state that
the incorporation of the Philadelphia Declaration into the constitution of the ILO,
ushered in a period of standard setting on human rights. As aforementioned, the
Declaration stated its aims in terms of human values and aspirations for example
by stating:
“all human beings, irrespective of race, creed, or sex,have the right
to pursue their material well-being and their spiritual development in
conditions of freedom and dignity of economic security and equal
opportunity”
This therefore places human rights at an important and pivotal part of its
discussions and activities. This inclination towards the realm of human rights is
very much evident from the number of conventions it has adopted within its
auspices, which has led to both the protection of labour standards and human
rights. Within the ILO, these conventions have been termed the fundamental
conventions and they include
-The Convention of Freedom of Association and the Right to Organise,
1948(No87)
- Convention on the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining, 1949(No
98)
- Convention on Forced Labour, 1957(No105)
- Convention on the Abolition of Forced Labour, 1957(No105)
- Convention on Equal Remuneration, 1950(No100)
- Convention on Discrimination (Employment and Occupation), 1958
(No111)
- Convention on Minimum Age .1973(No 138)
- Convention on the Worst Forms of Child Labour, 1999(No 182)
   It should be noted that these are considered to be the most fundamental
instruments in the field of human rights within the ILO.But it is worthy to also note
that the list is not exhaustive but merely illustrative because of the fact that there
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are other instruments which provide for the protection of human rights such as
those on women, disabled workers, migrant workers, indigenous and tribal
peoples and workers with family responsibilities .It can be seen that the rights
protected by the aforementioned conventions are also part of those under the
protection mandates  of the either the Bill of Rights or other human rights
conventions like the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Having said this, it is
worth looking at the various ways through which the ILO monitors compliance of
these conventions and how effective this has turned out to be.
4.4 MONITORING
The ILO has proven to be very successful in setting international labour and
human rights standards. But all the work involved in the setting of these standards
will amount to nothing if there is the lack of an effective monitoring system or
procedure. To this end, the Organisation has instituted two principal procedures
for the monitoring of compliance by member states and even non-member states
in some instances. The Organisation uses its regular procedure to receive and
examine reports from states on a number of conventions while on the other hand;
it uses its special procedure for the examination of representations and complaints
made against member states. A more detailed study will be made on the
aforementioned procedures to enhance a better understanding of the monitoring
procedure of the ILO.
  Regular procedure
     Article 22 of the ILO Constitution, provides that states make an annual report
to the International Labour Office on the measures they have taken to give effect
to the provisions of the conventions which they have ratified. At the beginning the
volume of reports received by the Committee in charge of their examination did
not constitute a problem since at that time only a few states had ratified the
various conventions. But by 1976 when the total number of conventions had risen
to 140, member states to 130 and ratifications to 4000,this constituted a problem
for the Committee examining these reports. It further got worse by 1994 when the
number of conventions had risen to 175 and over 6000ratifications.There was
therefore an urgent need for reforms and the Governing Body  began the practice
whereby it requested the reports on particular conventions such as those dealing
with human rights every other year while the reports on the other conventions
were requested after every five years. This consequently led to a reduction of the
amount of work handled by the Committee. Furthermore, before submitting their
reports, states are required to send copies of these reports to the most
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representative organisation of workers and employers in the country.94When state
reports are received by the International Labour Office, they are transmitted to
the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and
Recommendations created under the auspices of the Governing Body.
   This Committee carries out the examination of states reports at first instance .It
is also entrusted with the powers to examine governments reports on the situation
in national law and practice as regards selected unratified conventions and also
receives information supplied by governments as regard submission of newly
adopted conventions and recommendations to the competent national authorities
for enactment into their national systems.
    It is composed of 20 independent persons of the highest standing with eminent
knowledge in the social and legal fields and intimate knowledge in labour matters.
They are appointed by the Governing Body on the proposal of the Director
General in their personal capacity for a period of three years being renewable for
a successive period of three years. This Committee meets each year in November
and December. In the examination of state reports the Committee pays much
emphasis on the legislative and administrative measures, which have been taken to
give effect to ratified conventions, and also to what extent they have been
implemented. Nevertheless the Committee also receives information from other
sources like the workers´ and employers’ organisations, judicial decisions and
labour inspection services which usually provide some additional information not
contained in the state reports. At the end of its examination, it may issue its
comments in two forms.
    Firstly, it may issue an observation, which is usually written in its report that
goes to the Labour Conference, or it makes a direct request to the member state
concerned. The difference between these is that the former is used in situations
were there have been a continuous refusal by a state to submit its report on time
with the requested information or in cases of consistent non-compliance with
decisions of any of the Committees. Such a matter is sent to the Conference for
deliberations; the latter on the other hand is used in a case where the report does
not contain the information required and it is issued directly to the state to either
furnish the Committee with more information or provide it in its next report.
Unlike observations this is not included in the Committee’s final report.
  This report is forwarded to the Labour Conference and tabled before the
Conference Committee on the Application of Standards95. This Committee
usually comprises 150 members from the three groups of delegates (i.e.
government, workers and employers) and advisers. It examines the report of the
Committee of Experts at second instance .It obtains the desired information from
governments either in written form or orally, act expeditiously and presents its
report to the Labour Conference in a succinct and accurate form. The Labour
Conference sitting in plenary adopts the reports of its Committee and this is sent
to the governments concerned with their attention drawn to points they should
include in their next report.
                                                
94 Article 23(2) ILO constitution
95 Established by virtue of article 7 of the standing orders of the conference
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Special procedure
     The second main forms of monitoring under the ILO system are through the
procedures laid down in articles 24 and 26 of the Constitution and by the
Committee on the Freedom of Association. Complaints are made against states,
which have failed to give effect to the provisions of the conventions they have
ratified and take either one of the three forms; a representation 96, a complaint
97and the procedure established under the Committee of Freedom of Association.
     Firstly by virtue of Article 24,organisation of workers or employers may make
representations that a government has failed to take measures to give effect to the
convention that it has ratified. But in order for this representation to be received
and deliberated upon, it should fulfil the following requirements viz, it must be
communicated to the International Labour Office in writing98, must emanate from
an employers or workers organisation,99make specific reference to article 24 of
the constitution,100must concern a member,101must refer to a convention to which
the member against which it is made is a party102 and must indicate in what
respect the member against which it is made has failed to secure its observance
within its territory.103Once the Labour Office receives a representation, the
Director General notifies the states against which it is made and transmits it to the
Governing Body. The governing body appoints a Committee composed of its
members chosen in equal numbers from the government, workers and employers
groups to examine the said representation. The Committee’s report is presented
to the governing body, which further examines the representation and then issues
it decision. This decision is them communicated to the member state concerned
and the association, which made the representation. On the other hand article 10
of the standing orders provides that the Governing Body can institute a complaint
against a state in respect of which it had received and examined a representation.
      Secondly, article 26 of the Constitution goes further to provide for a
complaint procedure. Complaints can be filed by governments of countries that
have ratified the same convention, by workers´ or employers´ delegates to the
International Labour Conference and as already mentioned by the Governing
Body. On receipt of a complaint, the Governing Body may appoint a Commission
of Inquiry if it deems necessary to examine the said complaint. The Commission is
                                                
96 This is provided for in article 24 of the ILO constitution
97 Provided for by article 24 ibid
98 Standing orders article 2(ii) (a)
99 ibid (b)
100 ibid  (c)
101 ibid (d)
102 ibid(e)
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made up of three prominent independent members of the Governing Body. Due
to the complexities involve in their procedure, the Commission is given a wide
discretion to carry out its duties in whatever way it thinks appropriate but in
accordance with the object and purposes of the ILO.It acts as a quasi judicial
body in carrying out its functions by requesting documentary evidence and hears
witness evidence from the parties involve in the complaint with the infracting state
also requested to reply to all the allegations raised in the complaint. Furthermore,
if the Commission is not satisfied with the response provided by the state, it visits
the country concern for an on-the-spot investigation. The report containing its
findings and recommendations and time frame for their implementation are
communicated to the Governing Body, published in the ILO´s official bulletin and
served on the state involved. If a state fails to comply with the Commission’s
recommendation, the Governing Body in accordance with article 33 of the ILO
Constitution can propose to the Conference such measures as it may “deem wise
and expedient” to secure observance. But more often, the Committee of Experts
does the follow up of the recommendations to member states. It is also worth
stating that the decision of the Commission is considered to have been accepted
by the state to which it is addressed if within three months the state does not
indicate whether it accepts or rejects the said decision104. In case of the latter, the
state can take the matter to the ICJ whose decision on it is final.105
  The third monitoring procedure is through the Committee on Freedom of
Association. This Committee is vested with the competence to examine violations
of the constitutional principles of freedom of association and the right to collective
bargaining filed by workers´, employer’s organisations and governments. This is a
Tripartite Committee formed in 1951and since then, it has examined about 2000
cases of violations on the right to freedom of association. It meets thrice a year
and examines complaints even against states which have not ratified the ILO
conventions on the subject. This, it should be noted is a unique feature under
international law.
  To further complement the work of the Committee is the Fact- Finding and
Conciliatory Commission consisting of nine independent members working in a
panel of three appointed by the Governing Body. This was created in agreement
with ECOSOC in 1950 and examines complaints from the Governing Body in
respect of both countries, which have or have not ratified the freedom of
association conventions106even though in the latter case the state’s consent is
required. It may also receive complaints against non-member states when such
complaints are filed by the United Nations and the other state (i.e. the infracting
state) gives it consent.107It carries out fact-finding missions into allegations of
violations of the conventions and presents its report to the Governing Body. It is
                                                
104 Article 29 ILO constitution
105 Article 31 ibid
106 That is Freedom of Association and the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 no 87 and
Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention 1949 no 98
107 This was the case with regard to the United States during its absence from the ILO and
the Republic of South Africa.
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worthy to note that all the recommendations emanating from these bodies receive
follow up from the Committee of Experts.
   Lastly, the ILO may in some circumstances use ad hoc measures in the course
of its monitoring duties. This may take the form of request by the Labour
Conference to the Director General for reports on particular issues. For example
on the situation of workers in the Arab occupied territories. Under another
procedure instituted in 1964 a state may request for direct contacts to discuss
problems encountered in implementing the conventions. Added to this, is a
procedure for Special Study on Discrimination which was adopted in 1973 under
which a request can be made for the submission of a report   by a member state
or employer or worker organisation on specific questions which concern the
implementation of the conventions. Finally since 1985,the Governing Body has
requested information concerning the implementation of the Tripartite Declaration
of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy.
4.5 EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ILO
  Since it’s coming into existence, the ILO has been remarkable in setting
international labour and human rights standards. Having already discussed the
procedures by which these standards are monitored, it is worthwhile at this point
to show to what extent they have been effective in ensuring compliance by states
parties to the conventions.
  The ILO has to a very large extent been successful in following up
recommendations made by any of its organs to member states that do not give
effect to the provisions of the conventions they have ratified. Recommendations
from the Labour Conference, the Commission of Inquiry in the case of a
complaint, the Committee on Freedom of Association and the Fact-Finding and
Conciliatory Commission all receive follow up by the Committee of Experts on
Application of Conventions and Recommendations. This Committee issues
reminders to states in the form of direct requests where the non-compliance is not
consistent and observations in more consistent cases. The thorough and strong
language used in observations in particular and the publicity they get have led to a
remarkable trend of compliance by states. This is the case because states usually
tend to avoid the exercise of having their practice being sorted out and criticised
in public meetings such as in the International Labour Conference which is not
only inter-governmental but at the same time inter-occupational. Most government
representatives find it disconcerting to have to answer critical comments directed
at their countries. This particular procedure had made the decisions from the
organisation’s organs to be strictly adhered to and complied with by the states
against whom they are made.
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       Furthermore the practice of spotlighting cases of consistent non-compliance
in the “special list” has created the desire effect.108The main purpose of this list is
to generate a sense of uneasiness and of urgency on the part of the governments.
This has led some states to comply while others have given assurances that steps
towards fuller compliance will be taken.
 Added to this the Governing Body in cases of consistent non compliance with
any of the Committee’s decisions is empowered by Article 33 of the ILO
Constitution to propose to the Labour Conference such measures it may deem
wise and expedient to secure observance. This procedure was invoked in 1961
against South Africa 109, which eventually led to its withdrawal, and in 2000
against Myanmar due to its failure to respect the Forced Labour Convention
1930(no29).
  The ILO has instituted a very thorough, elaborate and effective procedure in the
examination of state reports, which is one of the means by which it gets
information on the degree of compliance. From the time the report is examined by
the Committee of Experts on Application of Conventions and Recommendations
at first instance, to when it gets to the Conference Committee on Standards, it is
sure to have been examined to the least details and the state given the opportunity
to present it and answer all the questions that may arise from it. Therefore at the
end of the procudure, all the details have been established and whatever decision
is made will definitely reflect the quality of the report. This two-tier process and
the somewhat “appeal procedure” available at the level of the Conference
Committee has given much credibility to the system and in most cases a general
compliance by the states.
  Next, the tripartite nature of the ILO has acted as a major factor in its
effectiveness. The invaluable contribution made by the occupational organisations
has greatly aided the Organisation in acquiring vital information on either the
examination of a state report, representation and complaint. The reports of these
organisations and in particular the workers organisations have proven to be very
useful in these procedures because time which had to be used in going into the
field to collect this information is used in the examination of the reports or
complaint as the case may be. Added to this, the locus standi given to the
occupational organisations under articles 24 and 26 of the Constitution to initiate
representations and complaints respectively and the integral part they occupy in
the organs has been a very positive aspect in the protection of human rights
standard within the Organisation. This means that they are not only able to
conveniently voice out their grievances but also vote on issues that directly affect
them. Since the aims and objectives of the Organisation evolve around the
protection of workers, it is but fair and reasonable enough that they should
constitute part of the decision-making process. The Organisation has therefore
                                                
108 The employers vice chairman in 1960 put it bluntly when he explained to the Conference
that “the idea of this list is to induce some shame on the part of the governments which
show a persistent lack of interest in their obligations”(44 R.P 430)
109 ILC, 45th session 1961, record of proceedings p 891.also pp575-577, 580-584;and 599-616
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used workers organisations as conduits for the flow of information from the
various member states to the Organisation.
     These occupational organisations have also helped the Committee of Experts
in its follow –up activities. By virtue of their presence, they have continuously put
constant pressure on states to comply with decisions of the various Committees
and report directly to the Governing Body in cases of non-compliance. This
constant pressure has tended to force states to implement these decisions. The
workers organisation in particular has created so much awareness within the
working population on the existing international labour standards. This has led to
joint and concerted actions at the national level to advocate for the respect of the
conventional standards.110
    The effectiveness of this tripartite nature of the ILO has encouraged other
states to follow the same example by instituting tripartite Labour Advisory Bodies.
These bodies carry out reviews on unratified conventions, recommendations
made and measures to be introduced in order to give them effect. Australia,
Canada and India are some of the countries, which have taken this step.
  Fourthly, the technical cooperation that exists between the ILO and its members
has led to a wide compliance with the recommendations taken by the Labour
Conference or its ancillary bodies. In this wise, the Organisation has used its
expertise in assisting states to draft their labour legislations. The ILO has regularly
worked in close contacts with governments to identify the obstacles they
encounter in the implementation of the conventions, recommendations and
observations. Recent visits to Argentina and Guatemala led to these countries
enacting Convention no 87 on Freedom of Association into their national
legislation. Added to this, this form of cooperation is one of the major reasons for
the wide ratifications of the various conventions,111.
   In practice, countries experiencing difficulties in filling up the forms (of report
used for the submission of state reports)) for the first time are urged to inform the
Director General so that arrangements can be made for advice to be given as to
the exact nature of the obligation and as to lines on which they should be met.
   The Organisation has also established regional offices and organises regional
seminars, which usually act as the focal point of discussions with the states,
occupational organisations and the ILO.These actions also lead to more familiarity
by states with their various obligations and thus develop their relations with the
ILO on a more concrete and regular basis.
  Furthermore, article 19(5)(b) and (e) of the ILO Constitution clearly spell out
duties on the states which have contributed to the Organisation’s effectiveness in
monitoring human rights standards. Firstly 5(b) states that member states after
ratifying a convention have at most eighteen months to bring the convention before
the authorities within whose competence the matter lies for adoption and
                                                
110 This had even led to the coming into power of Solidarity Party in Poland in the 1980s
which had the full support of the workers due to the state’s inability to protect the and
guarantee their rights.
111 Ratifications today of the various conventions stand at 7078 with 1177 for the
fundamental conventions and 5901 for the other conventions.
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enactment into national law. This has been done by so many states and the
outcome is that most of the ratified conventions have become part of national
legislation and has consequently led to the availability of remedies at the national
level once there is an infringement of these conventions.
  Article 5(e) on the other hand makes it possible for the ILO to also monitor the
state practices on conventions they have not yet ratified. States by virtue of this
article are required to report (usually referred to as “General Surveys”) on what
they are doing to apply conventions they have not yet ratified. This has given the
ILO organs an extended functional jurisdiction in holding states responsible even if
they have not ratified the convention on the subject matter.
  The creation of the various Committees’ within the Governing Body and the
Labour Conference leads to an effective functioning of the system. The fact that
all the tasks are carefully defined and assigned between these Committees is
worth mentioning. More effectiveness is achieved when separate Committees
(Committee of Experts and Committee on Standards) examine state reports and
receive representation, the Committee on Freedom of Association handle cases
on violations of the Convention on Freedom of Association and the Right to
Organise  while the Commission of Inquiry is solely responsible for the
examination of complaints. Most important is the fact that all recommendations of
these Committees and the Commission of Inquiry receive follow-up from the
Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations.
This well structured and organised system has greatly contributed to an effective
functioning of the ILO monitoring procedures.
  It is worth stating that the Committee on Freedom of Association presented its
report at the 285th session of the Governing Body in November 2002 citing cases
of serious infringements of the principle of freedom of association and violation of
trade union rights in Belarus, Zimbabwe, Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador and
Japan.
  In Belarus, the Committee cited the absence of progress towards the
implementation of previous recommendations and a serious deterioration with
respect to trade union rights within the country. It further called for an amendment
of Presidential decree (no 8) “so that workers´ or employers´ organisations may
benefit freely and without previous authorisation from the assistance which may be
provided by international organisations for activities compatible with freedom of
association”112.In the other countries, it called on the governments not to interfere
in the activities of the unions and for them to take measures to ensure the respect
of trade union rights .
  On the other hand, the ILO monitoring system is not void of problems. Firstly, it
has been criticised by some non-occupational non-governmental organisations for
not giving them the competence to institute representations or complaints before
any of its organs. It should however be noted that these criticisms have not really
led to changes within the system since some of these NGOs have an observer
status within the ILO.Added to this, they (the NGOs) can always in a joint
                                                
112 ILO /02/51
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program of action with the occupational organisations request the latter to initiate
complaints or representations against infracting states.
    The second problem is that of coordination at the level of the states. Since
labour matters are handled by the Ministry in Charge of Labour, some foreign
ministries insist on maintaining exclusive control over all contacts with the ILO.The
result of this is that supervision becomes very difficult and often leads to delays in
the flow of information from the state to the ILO and the other way round.113 The
ILO in such cases should insist on working with the labour ministries that have the
expertise in such matters.
   The third issue is that of empowering the workers organisations especially those
in developing countries. Some of these organisations lack the basic means to
organise the working population either due to financial problems or disunity that in
most cases are created by the governments in order to weaken the bargaining
power of these organisations. The ILO is therefore called upon to seriously
scrutinise governmental actions and encourage them through their cooperation
programs to provide some support to the worker organisations.
    In conclusion, the monitoring mechanism operated by the ILO has from
inception been very effective in protecting labour and human rights standards.
Even with the success it has achieved so far, there are still cases of violations of
labour standards in general and the fundamental conventions in particular. Added
to this, the Organisation has always stressed that its main purpose is not to
sanction states on their inability to comply with convention obligations but to
ensure that all the necessary efforts are made and assistance given to these states
to ensure a complete adherence to their obligations. The Organisation has always
stressed on its administrative role in encouraging states to carry out their
obligations rather than on its judicial role, which is often used as a last resort. The
most difficult problem has been the lack of the necessary means to implement
obligations by states. It is submitted here that the ILO should intensify its technical
cooperation programs and ensure that the states are given the means and know
how for an effective compliance with their obligations within the ILO mandate.
                                                
113 This was the situation in Ecuador where the ministry of external relations and that of
social welfare and labour were locked over the issue of whom to make communications to
and receive same from the ILO.the matter had to be settled by the president that the ministry
of social welfare and labour would henceforth correspond directly with the ILO.  hitherto
,the deadlock had resulted in considerable delays and difficulties by the ILO to transmit
technical correspondence thus preventing timely examination of reports and participation of
delegates at meetings.
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5 COMPARATIVE STUDY OF
THE THREE MONITORING
BODIES
This comparative analysis has as its main aim to pin point the differences and
some few similarities that exist between the Human Rights Committee, the African
Commission on Human and Peoples Rights and the International Labour
Organisation as they monitor their respective human rights instruments .For clarity,
the study will be made on the basis of the following guidelines viz State reporting,
jurisdiction, complaint procedure, NGO Access, follow up mechanisms,
composition and structure, technical cooperation/assistance and the role of special
rapporteurs.
 STATE REPORTING
A very vital part of their functions is that of the examination of reports from states
that have ratified the instrument whose compliance is sought for by each of the
bodies concern. Article 40 of the ICCPR, Article 62 of the ACHPR and Article
22 of the ILO constitution all require state parties to submit their reports for
examination.
   Unlike the other two instruments, the ACHPR does not expressly give the
Commission the competence to examine state reports but nonetheless the
Commission obtained permission at its third session from the Assembly to receive
and examine these reports and has since then positively interpreted the Charter as
giving it the competence to do so.
    There are some differences in the procedure of examination in the three
systems.  The ILO usually has a two-tier system where reports are first examined
by the Committee of Experts on the Application of Convention and
Recommendations and later by the Conference Committee on Standards, which
usually acts at second instance before a final observation is adopted by the
plenary session. But in the Human Rights Committee and the African
Commission, this not the case. It is just a one step process where examination is
done solely by the members and thereafter views or observations are adopted. It
is submitted that the ILO procedure is more thorough and effective than the
others due to the scrutiny and criticisms, which are done on these reports.
  The reports received by ILO are very detailed as compared to those received
by the Committee and the Commission. This has partly been blamed on the
somewhat lengthy and confusing guidelines issued by these supervisory bodies.
The ILO makes it much more easier for a state by providing a form, which clearly
indicates what type of information is needed. The Commission on its part at its
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twenty first ordinary session adopted a simpler set of eleven points which states
are expected to take into consideration when compiling their reports; the
Committee, has also instituted consolidated guidelines for reporting.
Notwithstanding, reports received by the Commission and  the Committee are
sometimes far below the level of expectation and lacking in substance. But due to
the more detailed procedure in the ILO, governments make every effort to submit
adequate reports, which will show the actual state practice.
   So far one of the greatest problems plaguing the Commission and the
Committee is that of states not submitting their reports and on time. Unlike the
Commission where reports are over due with some states not having submitted
their initial reports114, the situation in the Committee is improving with majority of
the states submitting their reports. The situation is much more encouraging in the
ILO which receives 65% of the reports due by the time of the Annual Conference
of the Committee of Experts, rising to 85 % by the Annual Labour Conference.115
JURISDICTION
  In terms of functional jurisdiction, the universality of the Committee and the ILO
is worth mentioning. While ratification of these instruments is open to all states
stricto senso under international law, the African Commission is a regional
organisation and thus having jurisdiction that extend as far as the geographical
limits of the continent. Even though article 60 of the Charter permits the
Commission to draw inspiration from other instruments of universal ratification;116
this does not per se give it a universal character since it can only apply this with
respect to the African states.117
   The Human Rights Committee has jurisdiction over all the member states which
come from the  different regions of the world and  which have ratified the
ICCPR118,  but not on states, which have not ratified the Covenant.
   The ILO is similar to the Human Rights Committee due to the fact that it also
has jurisdiction over those states which have ratified the conventions adopted
                                                
114 Even with the simplified guidelines issued by the Commission, some member states have
still failed to submit adequate reports. The Lesotho delegation during the 31st session did
not present their report on the grounds that they did not know what to report on.
115 Lee Swepston  The International Labour Organisation and Human Rights Access to the
ILO: International Human Rights Monitoring Mechanisms  (eds) Gudmundur Alfredsson et
al  .2001 Kluwer Law International
116 “The Commission shall draw inspiration from international law on human and
peoples´rights, particularly from the provisions of various African instruments on human
and peoples ´rights ,the Charter of the United Nations ,the Charter of the Organisation of
African Unity ,the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ,other instruments adopted by the
United Nations and by African countries in the filed of human and peoples´rights as well as
from the provision of various instruments adopted within the Specialised Agenices of the
United Nations of which the parties to the present Charter are members.”
117 Presently there are 53member states which have ratified the Charter
118 Presently there are 148 member states to the ICCPR
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under its auspices; but at the same time different because in respect with some of
its conventions like no 87 on Freedom of Association and the Right to Organise
which is considered as a constitutional principle, its jurisdiction is universal and it (
through the Committee of Freedom of Association) can examine complaints made
against any state irrespective of whether  it has ratified Convention no 87 or not.
Furthermore Article 19 (5)(e) makes it possible for the ILO to monitor the
practice of states even if they have not ratified the convention on the subject119.
By this provision, states are required to submit reports to the Organisation on
their practices in respect of conventions that they have not ratified. This therefore
gives the ILO a wider functional jurisdiction unlike the other mechanisms.
 COMPLAINT PROCEDURE
   The procedures used for the initiation of complaints by the three mechanisms
may at a glance seem to be similar but do have their differences. Under the
Human Rights Committee, the complaint procedure is victim based and very
individualistic in nature. Stricto senso it is based on the premise that only the
victim who has suffered the violation of his rights can initiate a complaint.
Nevertheless, the Committee has been seen admitting complaints filed on behalf
of group of individuals120and others filed by persons who can establish a close
and genuine link with the victim such as the lawyers who handled the case at the
domestic level121. This interpretation of the OP is very liberal  but notwithstanding,
this jurisprudence should be noted has not really changed the Committee’s
approach; that of victim based. In C et. al. v Italy, the Committee held  as
follows
         “According to Article 1 of the Optional Protocol only individuals have
the right to submit a communication .To the extent, therefore, that the
communication originates from the organisation, it has to be declared inadmissible
because of lack of personal standing”122
Similarly in J.T. v Canada, the committee declared a communication
inadmissible, partly because the “W.G Party is an association and not and not an
                                                
119 “If the member does not obtain the consent of the authority or authorities, within whose
competence the matter lies, no further obligation shall rest upon the member except that it
shall report to the Director General of the International Labour Office at appropriate intervals
as requested by the Governing Body, the position of its law and practice in regard to the
matter dealt with in the convention showing the extent to which effect has been given, or is
proposed to be given, to any of the provisions of the convention by
legislation,administratve action ,collective agreement or otherwise and stating the
difficulties which prevent or delay the ratification of such convention.”
120 Chief Bernard Ominayak, Chief of Lubicon Lake Band v Canada no 167/1984
121 Morais v Madagascar (supra) and Burrell v Jamaica (supra)
122 Case no 163/1984 HRC 1984 Report, Annex XV, para 5
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individual and as such cannot submit a communication to the committee under the
Optional Protocol”123
    On the other hand, the African Commission operates a more open and liberal
procedure, which is based on actio popularis .It is more liberal than the
Committee’s procedure. Under the Commission, victims, their relatives, NGOs
and any person who may have sufficient knowledge of the violations can file
complaints. This very liberal interpretation has led to a simplification of the whole
complaint procedure. This has also led to the development of jurisprudence for
the Commission, which has in turn created much awareness among the public of
human rights protection.
   The ILO on its part operates a completely different procedure. It distinguishes
between a representation and a complaint like in the other systems. The
Committee of Experts on Application of Conventions and Recommendations
examines the former while a Commission of Inquiry examines the latter. Under
this system, a complaint is considered more serious than a representation and is
usually used in cases of consistent violations. Added to this while a victim or
members of his family and NGOs can file a complaint to the  Commission , the
victim has not got the locus standi to initiate a complaint before the
ILO.Complaints can only be made by the occupational organisations,
governments, the Governing Body and a worker’s or an employer’s delegate in
the Labour Conference. This has made it very difficult for complaints to be made
especially when the violations occur in countries where the occupational and
employers organisations are not well organised.
   Another important issue to note is that of exhaustion of domestic or local
remedies. Within the Human Rights Committee and the African Commission,
domestic remedies are expected to have been exhausted before any complaint is
made to any of the two bodies. This rule is waived only in situations where it can
be proven that such remedies don’t exist and even if they do are inadequate and
their procedures usually take an unreasonably long time. Within the ILO, no such
requirement exists.
NGO ACCESS AND PARTICIPATION
 NGOs are very active players in monitoring human rights standards all over the
world. They usually make invaluable contributions in providing the information
needed by the monitoring bodies and create awareness by organising seminars
and workshops to disseminate human rights information and materials to the
population.
                                                
123 HRC 183 Report, Annex XXIV,para 8
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 Within the Human Rights Committee, NGO access and participation is very
minimal. They attend sessions as observers and are not allowed to contribute
actively in the debates of the Committee. In a sense they are relegated to the back
role. Thus within the Committee’s procedure there is a very limited access given
to NGOs ..
  On the other hand and in the African Commission, the story is quite different.
Not withstanding the fact that they have also been given an observer status, the
NGOs are allowed to be active participants in the proceedings and as already
mentioned to file complaints before the Commission. NGOs are given air time to
speak at the sessions and contribute in the public sessions. To illustrate NGO
participation, for example, in the March 2002 session held in Pretoria, Professor
Michelo Hansungule presented a lecture on Effects of Slavery on behalf of the
African Centre for Democracy and Human Rights an NGO based in Banjul.
  The situation in the ILO is much more a different issue. The NGOs are placed
on the ILO´s “special list of NGOs”. Organisations on this list may receive
information from the ILO and be invited to meetings on request. Furthermore,
under the standing orders of the Labour Conference, NGOs may only attend
sessions of the Conference as observers if they have requested and received an
invitation from the Governing Body.124Those attending have the right to intervene
in a Committee with permission from the Chairman or his vice. It  is worthy to
note that NGOs do have a very limited access to the ILO and no access at all to
the complaint procedure. Even though NGOs are not represented, occupational
organisations are very much present and active. They actually form an integral
part of the Organisation. They have been seen to play the role played by NGOs
in the other monitoring mechanisms. These organisations play a much more
powerful role within the system than the NGOs in the other systems. They are
represented in all the main organs and take part in all the major decisions of the
Organisation.
FOLLOW UP MECHANISM
  The degree at which decisions taken by the three mechanisms receive follow up
vary at great lengths
  . Firstly, the Commission is in dire need of a follow up procedure. More often
the decisions taken by the Commission do not receive follow up. This has made
these decisions to be mere paper work and has considerably weakened its
potential to enforce the rights as spelt out in the Charter. States are fully aware of
this weakness and inability to act and thus do not bother to comply with its
decisions. The Commission has gone ahead to institute the posts of Special
Rapporteurs on women, in charge of prisons and that of extra judicial and
summary killings. But due to financial and logistical problems, they have not be
                                                
124 Standing orders of the International Labour Conference Article 2(3)(j)
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able to carry out their respective functions .The general rate of compliance by
states with the Commission’s decisions has been very discouraging and this to a
very large extent has given the latter the image of a toothless bull dog.
   Secondly, the case with the Committee is more encouraging. With the
appointment of the Special Rappoteur on Follow up of Views, things are
beginning to work out well for the Committee. It has been able to receive
information from the victims on their compensation by the state against which a
decision was made. In 2000, 30 % of cases decided were complied with by the
states concerned. This is quite encouraging especially when one takes into
consideration the fact that theses decisions are not binding and cannot be
enforced against the state concerned. Even though the Special Rapporteur on
Follow up on Views also suffers from the absence of funds to make as many trips
as he may be expected to, his trip to Jamaica was very instrumental in changes
that occurred thereafter since it led to an improvement in the prison and detention
facilities in that country. With an increase in funds and a little cooperation from
states, there is no doubt that the Committee will be able to follow up on a much
regular basis the rate at which its decisions have been complied with.
  Thirdly, within the ILO, follow up is done principally by the Committee of
Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations. States are
required to include in their next report the measures they have taken to give effect
to the decisions taken against them by any of the organs during the previous year.
The part played by the occupational organisations in terms of follow up should be
emphasised. Due to their presence in states, these organisations usually put
pressure on the governments to comply with decisions and report to the ILO in
cases where there has been non-compliance. Through this kind of procedure, the
practice of states is closely monitored thus leaving the states with no other options
but full compliance.
COMPOSITION /STRUCTURE
 It is also worthwhile to look at the differences that exist in composition and
structure of the three monitoring bodies.
 The Commission is made up of eleven members appointed in their personal
capacity. Eventhough they are called independent experts, in reality they are not.
Most of them as already mentioned still occupy top governmental positions in
their various countries and thus still very much linked with their respective states.
   The Committee is made up of eighteen experts also elected in their personal
capacity. Notwithstanding the fact that some of the members had occupied
governmental positions in their various states, they have insisted on and asserted
their independence from their states. They have tended to act more as
independent experts unlike the situation in the Commission.
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   The ILO  operates on a tripartite system whereby the workers, employers and
government delegates are members of the various Committees 125which is totally
different from the other two systems. It has four different bodies that are
responsible for monitoring. The Committee of Experts on Application of
Conventions made up of twenty independent experts, the Conference Committee
on Standards made up of 150 members, the Committee on Freedom of
Association and the Fact-Finding and Conciliation Commission made up of nine
members each and lastly the Commission of Inquiry made up of three prominent
members of the Governing Body.
 STATUS
   The ILO is a specialised agency within the United Nations .It is also an
autonomous body in both its executive and financial functions. It adopts its own
yearly budget and receives contributions directly from members.
  But on the other hand, the Human Rights Committee is a treaty body open to
those states which have ratified the ICCPR.But strictly speaking, it is not that
completely independent since it receives funding from the contribution made by
member states to the United Nations and, its secretariat functions are executed by
the secretariat of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.
   The Commission on its part very much subservient to the Assembly of Heads of
States and Governments of the OAU in the execution of its functions. It has
become an organ of the OAU even though it was intended to be an independent
body. It is financed by funds from the Organisation and is required to seek the
permission of the Assembly in order to carry out certain functions; for example
the publishing of its annual report that reveals the practice of states. This is not the
case with the ILO or Human Rights Committee.
TECHINACAL COOPERATION /ASSISTANCE
 The ILO within its mandate provides technical assistance to its members
especially where there are difficulties in implementing the provisions of its
conventions. It has on a number of cases offered its expertise to states in the
drafting of labour legislations and in cooperation with states sought solutions to
obstacles on the ratification and implementation of conventions. This should be
noted is one of the reasons for the huge load of ratifications.
 The Committee and Commission on their part do not have the necessary means
to do this. In the first place, they are very limited in terms of membership and
therefore cannot afford such a huge task. Secondly, they cannot afford the
                                                
125 Except for the finance committee and the committee of experts which is composed only of
government representatives
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financial demands of such a venture. The African Commission’s practice of
allocating countries to its Commissioners for regular visits and to enable them to
be in touch with the problems facing its member states has not been effective; this
is mainly because of chronic lack of resources.
     Added to all of these are some minor but important differences between these
mechanisms.
    Firstly, the African commissioners also serve as rapporteurs for the
Commission while in the Committee members are necessarily not rapporteurs.The
rapporteurs are experts contracted by the Commission on Human Rights. It
should be noted that the African approach deprives the commissioners the
opportunity to concentrate on the Commission’s work. Within the ILO, the
concept of rapporteur as seen in the Commission and Committee is absent.
    Secondly, the Commission separates the finding on admissibility from merit
consideration but the Committee on its part has developed the practice treating
the two stages as one. The latter of course saves a lot of time. The ILO operates
a similar procedure like the Committee at the level of its Committees.
    Thirdly, until its 29th session, the African Commission did not prepare
concluding observations and comments on state reports. This has been a regular
practice of the Committee while the ILO on it part has always prepared
observations on state reports.
 Lastly, decision making in the Committee is based on unanimity. But in the event
of a vote and there is a tie, it is absolutely difficult to arrive at a decision because
the chairperson has not got a casting vote. But the composition of the African
Commission prevents such a situation from occurring provided all the members
participate in the voting process. In the ILO voting is by a simple majority even
though in some cases like the admission of a new member, a corresponding two
third majority from the government representatives is required.
SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR
 Within the Human Rights Committee and the African Commission, the role of
rapporteurs has been well established. Individuals are given mandates to carry on
specific tasks within  the Committee and Commission. With the ILO this is not
exactly the case. Its work is done in committees and decisions taken at this level.
The Director General is the one who is asked by the Governing Body or the
Conference to report back with recommendations; therefore the secretariat has
been seen to play a similar role to that of special rapporteurs. However in the
Committee of Experts different individuals have initial responsibility for certain
conventions but all decisions on their comments are made by the Committee as a
whole. The DG recently appointed a Special Representative on the Freedom of
Association Convention to Colombia (last two years now expired) and the
Special Representative to Myanmar took up her post in October .In a nutshell;
special rapporteur is not an ILO phenomenon.
51
With all these discrepancies associated with these monitoring bodies, some slight
similarities can also be drawn.
Firstly, their decisions are not binding on the member states and so need a mode
of enforcement.
Secondly, they all have some familiarity in their monitoring procedures based on
the fact that they all entertain inter state complaints, examine state reports and
entertain individual complaints even though within the ILO it is on a much-
localised manner.
Thirdly, these bodies to an extent consist of experts within each field of
competence.
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6 CONCLUSION
After having looked at the three monitoring mechanisms and the problems and
difficulties they encounter it is worth while to propose some measures which will
go a long way to improve on their effectiveness.
 Starting with the Human Rights Committee, it is recommended that the function
of the special rapporteur for the follow up on views can be made more effective if
the Committee makes public the follow up reports and publicise its activities to
the extent that it doesn’t jeopardise the dialogue with the state. It should envisage
the appointment of a full time professional staff member to follow up its activities
because of the increase in the number of cases coming in and the number of views
being adopted by it. In this vein, follow up activities should be budgeted by the
Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights since states are very reluctant
to invite the rapporteur to scrutinise their activities at their expense. Moreso, a
detailed program for follow up and consultations should be drawn up well ahead
of time in order to give states sufficient time to prepare their responses
 States on their part should take the responsibility to enact enabling legislations
that will give the decisions of the Committee a legal backing and make them easy
to implement within their various domestic systems.
   The Committee can also be given the powers to hand down advisory opinions.
This will enable courts in the domestic legal systems, which are uncertain about
the applicability or interpretation of a provision to suspend consideration of the
case and approach the Committee for further clarification. This can be achieved
by the adoption of an additional Optional Protocol. Such a move will lead to the
Committee giving interpretations of the provisions of the ICCPR and secondly this
can possibly lead to adequate remedies at the domestic level and consequently
reduce the number of cases coming to the Committee.
   Added to this, due to the rapid increase in the number of cases coming to the
Committee, it is suggested that its secretariat staff strength be improved in order
to enable it contain this massive influx.
  The duration of the meetings (nine weeks) annually is not sufficient for the
Committee to meet up with the ever-growing workload of cases. The number of
sessions should be increase in order for the Committee to have sufficient time in
the examination of both the reports and communications.
  Furthermore, the Committee should put in additional efforts in publicising its
activities thereby creating an awareness of its procedure in particular and work in
general and insist on this to be carried out by member states within their
respective territories.
 The Committee should increase the level of participation of non government
organisations within its system to enable them play a more active role especially in
the filing of complaints against defaulting states.
 Lastly states are also called upon to develop the right attitude and political will
towards the Committee by providing the required information for the smooth
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functioning of its examination procedures and they should be willing to give its
decisions the right effect.
  It has been posited that the Committee alongside the other treaty bodies should
be turned into one international human rights court. This will be a full time standing
court with a mandate to oversee the implementation of the various human right
treaties within the United Nations. It is hope that such a body with permanent
judges will be more effective in the protection of human rights especially due to
the fact that it will be able to deliver binding judgements. However, this is still an
academic moot point and its development is worth paying attention to.
 The African Commission in particular should envisage putting all the structures it
has created in full and effective use. It is suggested that the financial and logistical
problems faced by the rapporteurs be looked into to enable them follow up the
Commission’s resolutions and make them more effective.
 Furthermore the Commission should envisage stepping up the level of publicity it
is currently doing in order to create the much-needed awareness. This can still be
done by the organisation of regular regional seminars and putting pressure on
member states to commemorate the African human rights day on the 21st of
October. Still on this issue member states are called upon to develop the right
attitude by educating their citizens on the human rights standards contained in the
Charter.
  With the coming of the African Union and its subsidiary organs it is expected
that the much needed finances be made available to the Commission and the latter
will be free from political interference as was the case with the OAU.
 Furthermore, the Commission should be empowered by its rules of procedure to
directly address emergency situations rather than first contacting the Assembly of
Heads of States and Governments. As already noted this procedure takes so
much time, which may lead to irreparable harm being done to the victim.
  The commissioners on their part are called upon to act dynamically and be
apolitical as much as possible during their visits to member states and meeting
with government official. As already mentioned they should use this opportunity to
pressurise the authorities of infracting states to halt violations. Added to this, with
the gradual change in mentality and political will recently expressed by some
African leaders, it is hoped that the African Commission will be free from political
interference by the African Union.
 Also, the choice of having the headquarters of the Commission should be
carefully reconsidered. The reason for this choice was because The Gambia had a
democratic and stable government at the time. But today, so many things have
changed and there is a military leader who came to power through a coup détat,
which is of course at variance with the provisions of the Charter. It should be
noted that if the headquarters was based in a capital with big academic institutions
like universities and research institutes, the secretariat would have benefited from
the services of the students or researchers on a regular basis and as such this
would have been a solution to its shortage of personnel. The member states are
therefore called upon to give this point some reconsideration.
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   The African states are also called upon to ratify the Protocol to the
establishment of the African Court of Human and Peoples Rights. This, it is hoped
will complement the Commission and offer a wider, adequate and more effective
form of protection in human rights.
  The ILO on its part has also been doing a remarkable job in the protection of
human rights especially those enshrined in the conventions adopted within its
auspices. But be as it may, there are still abuses on labour standards worldwide.
   It is therefore recommended the ILO should envisage giving access to non-
occupational organisations to its monitoring processes in general and the
complaints procedures in particular. Notwithstanding the fact that the
occupational organisations play an active part in this process it is also worthwhile
to allow other organisations to play this role taken into consideration the fact that
not all the occupational organisations are that strong enough to be able to monitor
compliance in their various states. Some of these non occupational organisations
(for example Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch) have been seen to
posses immense strength in terms of finances and personnel than some of the
occupational organisations and are more able to monitor and file complaints in
cases of violations.
 Furthermore and in almost similar terms, the ILO should endeavour to strengthen
the various workers unions in its member states especially those in the developing
world, which have been made considerably weaker by the political landscape in
which they are operating. More pressure should be put on member states to aid
these unions if not financial at least logistically; states should also desist from
intervening in the activities of these unions .It should be noted that it is only
through a well organised workers  ´or employers union will monitoring in most
cases will be effective.
  More so, it is hoped that ILO continues to intensify its technical cooperation
programs with member states and the occupational organisations. This is going to
facilitate the state’s compliance with the conventions since obstacles will be easily
detected and solved and will consequently lead to the implementation of these
conventions. The ILO should pay much emphasis on its administrative rather than
judicial functions.
 Lastly and as already mentioned, the ILO should base its cooperation with
member states through their ministries of labour and not the ministries of foreign
affairs. This is because it is the former, which has the expertise to deal with issues
that directly fall within the mandate of the ILO and also will curb the amount of
bureaucracy and time wasted when dealing with the ministries of foreign affairs.
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